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NOTICE TO OUR READERS -
With this issue, Volume 40, number 1, the traditional name
DICTA is changed to the DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL.
Since 1923, DICTA and its predecessor The Denver Bar Association
Record have been serving the Bench and Bar of Colorado with
commentary and analysis of the developments in Colorado law.
The new University of Denver Law Center now houses the
Denver Bar Association, the Colorado Bar Association and the Uni-
versity of Denver College of Law, the cooperating publishers of
ihis journal, which fact has given rise to the new name.
The editors suggest, for the sake of uniformity, that the journal
be cited Denver L.C.J.
The Denver Bar Association, the Colorado Bar Association and
the University of Denver College of Law invite your submission of
articles for publication in the journal and express our appreciation
for the continued support of our three thousand subscribers in this
country and abroad.
- The Editors
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HOMESTEAD VS. MECHANICS' LIEN
By DAVID W. KNAPP*
I. HOMESTEADS (HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES)
"Tenantry is unfavorable to freedom. It lays the foun-
dation for separate order in society, annihilates the love of
country, and weakens the spirit of independence. The ten-
ant has, in fact, no country, no hearth, no domestic altar,
no household god. The freeholder, on the contrary, is the
natural supporter of free government, and it should be the
policy of republics to multiply their freeholders, as it is the
policy of monarchies to multiply their tenants."
Thus spoke Senator Benton in advocating in the United States
Senate the adoption of a general homestead policy.' The homestead
is defined by Black as being, "technically, and under the modern
homestead laws, an artificial estate in land, devised to protect the
possession and enjoyment of the owner against the claims of his
creditors, by withdrawing the property from execution and forced
sale, so long as the land is occupied as a home.'"2 On the other hand
Tiffany tells us that while the homestead frequently has the char-
acteristics of an estate, it is difficult to conceive how the right of an
owner of land to hold such land exempt from liability for debts can
be in any sense an "estate."" Regardless of the difficulty of precise
characterization of the homestead, the need for such laws has been
recognized 4 and their beneficial objectives jealously protected in
those states granting such rights.
The desirability of such protection for the homeowner was rec-
ognized by the framers of the Colorado Constitution when they
provided the general assembly with authority to pass liberal home-
stead and exemption laws.-- This protection of the homeowner was
made real by the Legislature when they enacted the predecessor of
what is now Article 3 of Chapter 77 of the Colorado Revised Sta-
tutes.' This, of course, was only a step in the right direction. The
ultimate protection and its extensiveness had to be determined by
the supreme court by interpretation of the statutory provisions.
In laying down a guide for subsequent interpretation of the
statutes the supreme court stated, in an early case,7 the two govern-
ing principles underlying all homestead legislation. These principles
were declared to be,
"First, the beneficient design of protecting the citizen house-
holder and his family from the danger of miseries of desti-
tution consequent upon business reverses, or against cala-
mities arising from other causes; and, second, the sound
public policy of securing the permanent habitation of the
family, and cultivating the local interest, pride, and affec-
Recent graduate, University of Denver College of Low.
1 Thirty Years in the Senate, 103-104; see Thompson, Homestead and Exemption Laws, §1 (1878).
2 Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
52 Tiffany, The Modern Law of Real Property 1121 (1903).
4 Forty-six states presently have provisions either in their constitutions or in their statutes. See
,ppendices A and B.
5Colo. Const. art. XVIII, 1.
(!Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-3-1 to 77-3-11 (1953).
7 Barnett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 Pac. 747 (1884).
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tion of the individual, so essential to the stability and pros-
perity of a government."'s
In that same case the court went farther in laying down a sound
basis for giving full effect to the statutory provisions for the home-
stead by saying "homestead exemption is entirely the creature of
statute, but the statute is not in derogation of the common law, for
at common law the creditor had no right to sell the debtor's land,
(Thomp. Homest. & Ex., Sec. 2, and note;) and the rule is fully
established that the statutory provisions are to be liberally con-
strued for the purpose of giving effect to the principles above
named."71 Through the years, since Barnett v. Knight, the Colorado
Supreme Court has continued to recognize these fundamental prin-
ciples and has further strengthened the position of the homestead
by declaring that the statute in no way rests upon the principles of
equity and does not in any way yield thereto. " '
Two other declarations by the court have placed the homestead
in an almost insurmountable position with regard to claims by cre-
ditors. First, the court has stated that "the policy of the State is to
preserve the home to the family, even at the sacrifice of just de-
mands, for the reason that the preservation of the home is deemed
of paramount importance."' 1 Second, in the response to a question
whether the homestead was vitiated when the designation thereof
as a homestead was for the purpose of preventing the creditor from
collecting his debt, the court held and has repeatedly affirmed that
such purpose and the consequent result of such designation are
warranted by the statute.1 '
Thus, it is seen that the Colorado Supreme Court has fully
recognized the importance of the homestead and has constantly
striven for its fullest protection.
II. MECHANICS' LIENS (HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES)
The mechanics' lien is also based on strong underlying public
policy. At common law, no lien upon land was recognized.' 1 There-
fore. at present, the only liens which can be imposed upon land,
apart from equitable liens proper and mortgages, are those author-
ized by statute, known as "statutory liens."'' A lien is defined by
Black as "a charge or security or encumbrance upon property."'7
Tiffany describes the mechanics' lien as "a lien on land and on the
fixtures and improvements thereon, created by statute, to secure
the compensation of persons who, under contract with the owner
or some person authorized in his behalf, contribute labor or mate-
rials to the improvement of the land."' ; This definition leads in-
evitably to the basic purpose behind the mechanics' lien. The object
and purpose of the mechanics' lien statute as stated by Lane "is to
secure to the mechanic and materialman who, by their labor and
material, have directly contributed to enhance the value of prop-
erty. the security of a lien thereon to the extent they have thus
Id. at 370, 3 Pac. at 748.
9 Id. at 370, 3 Pac. at 748-49.
1 McPhee v. O'Rourke, 10 Colo. 301, 15 Pac. 420 (1887).
11 Id. at 307, 15 Pac. at 423.
1" Id. at 306, 15 Pac. at 422.
]: 2 Tiffany, The Modern Lo- of Real Property 1296 (1903).
14 Ibid.
See note 2 supra
See note 13 supro at 1297.
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added to its value." 7 The Colorado Supreme Court aptly stated the
purpose of the mechanics' lien when it said, "The manifest object
is to prevent wrong to the mechanics by alienation or incumbrances
during the progress of the work. Subsequent alienations or incum-
brances are not prevented, but made subordinate to the right of the
mechanics who, at the time, were engaged in working and continued
afterward to work under previous employment by the vendor.""'
The statutory proceedings to enforce such rights as are granted
under the mechanics' lien laws are in their nature equitable and
were administered by the Chancery side of the court at the time
such was in being.19 Thus, in considering the objects and purposes
of the mechanics' lien laws, the underlying public policy seems to
be made self-evident. The legislature was attempting to alleviate
the plight of the laborer and materialman and to prevent the prop-
erty owner from perpetrating a wrong upon them. That this policy
is deserving of serious consideration and that these laws should be
construed liberally in order to advance their purposes and objects
and to favor those who have the right to invoke their aid was made
quite clear early in Colorado judicial history.20
Thus, we have considered two entirely separate statutory
rights granted by the Colorado legislature and the policies, pur-
poses and objectives advanced by them. The questions that remain
are: First, whether the rights granted by these statutes will come
into conflict, and when? Second, if and when that occurs, which one
will be superior and why?
III. THE PROBLEM
Conceivably, two problems could arise in connection with 'he
application of these two statutory provisions. In order to understand
these problems better, two fact situations will be posed to illustrate
how they might arise.
A. In the first situation, let us suppose that H, home owner,
owns a home which he has, according to the statute, desig-
nated as a homestead. Subsequently, he decides to place an
addition on his house.2 1 In order to do this, H hires C, con-
tractor, to do the work and buys the material for the addi-
tion from M, a materialman. For various possible reasons,
either C or M, or both, have not been paid."2
B. In the second situation, nearly the same facts appear but
the time sequence will be changed slightly. In this instance,
let us assume that H has not designated his home as a
homestead until after the work was started and material
furnished but before the completion of the job and before
execution on any judgment.
17 Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 3 (1948).
I t Mellor v. Valentine, 3 Colo. 255 (1877), citing Phillips, Mechancis' Liens, Sec. 228-229 (2d ed.
1883).
515 The San Juan and St. Louis Mining and Smelting Co. v. French, 6 Colo. 214 (1882).
2; Maker v. Shull, 11 Colo. App. 322, 52 Pac. 1115 (1898); Cornell v. Canine-Eaton Lumber Co.,
9 Colo. App. 225, 47 Pac. 912 (1896).
"71 Presumably the problem could not arise where the work accomplished was the entire construc-
tion of the house since it is necssary in Colorado to occupy the homestead. However, this type
of factual situation and problem has arisen in other states where the homestead was declared
bfore the mechanics' lien was perfected or where mere intent was sufficient to establish the home-
stead and occupancy was not a requisite. Also, of course, there is a stated exception in favor of
the vendor's lien.
22 In some states whether the unocid person is C or M seems to be very critical. However. in
Colorado it appears that it would make little difference with the possible exception of the equities
being greater in one case than the other. Sometimes, non-payment of M is caused by insolvency of C.
VOL. XL
IHOMESTEAD V. MECHANICS" LIENS
In either case above, C or M, or both, could presumably avail
themselves of the proceedings for foreclosure and sale of the prop-
erty under the mechanics' lien laws. This of course is assuming that
they have complied with the statutory requirements of notice, fil-
ing, etc. It also seems possible, however, from the strict wording
of the homestead statutes that H could prevent the sale of his house
by reason of its designation as a homestead.
2 :
1
Here, it will be observed, the problem has arisen. H is entitled,
according to the statute, to his homestead exemption. Similarly, C
and 1\4 are entitled to satisfaction of their judgments for mechanics'
liens
It should probably be noted here that in order to make the problem really exist it will have
to be assumed that the value of the property, even after the addition, does not exceed the statutory
limit of 55,000. It might also be worthy of mention at this point that a problem can arise with
regard to additions concerning the actual sale, Supposedly, the lien exists only on that part of a
house on which the work was done.
I L When it comes to the home
of your choice,
the ultimate in living is a matter of personal need
and preference. But when it comes to modern elec-
trical living, people agree that the Medallion symbol
of quality is always first choice.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
AN INVESTr. OW0E -1 ri -e MOE-
1963
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Whether the second problem can arise must, of course, depend
upon the solution to the first problem. If the homestead is not su-
perior to the mechanics' lien when it is filed before the work was
done or material furnished, a fortiori, the homestead could not be
superior in the second case. However, if the homestead in the first
case is superior to the mechanics' lien, then the question arises
whether it is superior in all cases, e.g., in problem 2.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PROBLEM
A. The Homestead
1. The Constitutional Provisions
The Colorado Constitution provides that "The general assembly
shall pass liberal homestead and exemption laws. ' '-4 Exactly what
this means or indicates concerning a possible solution to the present
problem is difficult to determine. The constitutional provision has
seldom been discussed in Colorado cases. In Wright v. Whittick ,
it was held that this provision does not designate what shall con-
stitute a homestead but that the statute must be examined to deter-
mine such matters. It has also been held that homestead laws are
not in derogation of the common law and that they should be lib-
erally construed..26 ; Thus, it seems that the constitutional provision
for the homestead exemption is somewhat meager and offers little
aid in an analysis of the problem. An investigation into the consti-
tutional history of this section has proved fruitless. However, it
must be borne in mind that at least the framers of the Colorado
Constitution felt the homestead was of sufficient importance to
warrant specific mention of it.
2. Statutory Provisions.
The Colorado statute provides that "every householder in the
State of Colorado, being the head of a family, shall be entitled to a
homestead not exceeding in value the sum of five thousand dollars,
exempt from execution and attachment, arising from any debt, con-
tract or civil obligation,entered into or incurred after the effective
date of this section. -2 7 Other sections of the homestead laws declare
the method for claiming the exemption,'2 the fact that it must be
occupied, -'2 1 the rights of widows,"' the method of levy when the
value exceeds the five thousand dollar limit,1 the fact that the
homestead is not valid against a vendor's lien ,32 and other matters
not directly concerned with this problem.
It is interesting to note that there is a specific exception to the
homestead exemption, namely, the vendor's lien, and that exception
is the sole stated exception. Therefore any other exception must
necessarily be implied.
24 Coo. Const. art. XVIII, § 1.
25 18 Colo. 54, 31 Pa. 490 (1892).
26 Edson-Keither & Co. v. Bedwell, 52 Colo. 310, 122 Pac. 392 (1913); Martin v. Bond, 14 Colo.
466, 24 Pac. 326 (1891).
27 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-1 (1953).
28 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-2 (1953).
29 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-3 (1953).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. 77-3-4 (1953).
31 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-6 (1953).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-7 (1953).
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In looking at the statute declaring a right to homestead, a few
words and phrases stand out and might possibly indicate a solution
to the problem. Note that the homestead is exempt from "execution
and attachment." There are two different theories in regard to the
operation and effect of the homestead statute upon the liens of
judgments.3:r One theory is that no lien attaches at all, and the other
is that the lien attaches but is in abeyance so long as the require-
ments of the homestead statute are complied with. The first theory
is the one that has been adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court. :4
From this it could be reasoned that no lien will attach regardless
of how it arose, whether it was by obtaining a judgment or by com-
plying with the mechanics' lien laws.
It should also be noted that the statute declares the homestead
to be exempt from "any debt, contract, or civil obligation." This
particular wording was discussed in an early Colorado case, - and
as might be suspected the language was held to be sufficiently
broad and comprehensive to embrace any and all forms of indebted-
ness. This would appear to exclude any argument that the me-
chanics' lien is a peculiar type of obligation which will defeat the
operation of the homestead exemption statute. One more thing re-
garding the homestead statutory provisions must be noted in any
discussion on this topic. Nowhere in the homestead laws of Colorado
is there stated an excep t ion in favor of the mechanics' lien. This
will be discussed in greater detail when the laws of other states are
examined. The most logical conclusion that can be drawn at this
point, however, is that the statutory construction theory of "expres-
sio wnius est exclusio alterius" applies and that the expression of
an exception in favor of only the vendor, and of no others, pre-
cludes any other exception from being implied.
At this point it may seem to some to be ridiculous even to con-
sider the possibility that a mechanics' lien might be superior to and
operate against a prior recorded homestead. This does not appear
to be so ridiculous, however, when one considers the statements of
supreme courts of several other states, to the effect that homesteads
and exempted property under homestead laws are liable the same
as other property, the law deeming it more equitable to protect the
mani who puts his labor or money into the property than to preserve
it for the family.'"
B. The Mechanics' Lien
1. Constitutional Provisions.
There is no provision for a mechanics' lien in the Colorado Con-
stitution. Any possible indication as to a solution of this problem,
based upon the absence of a constitutional provision for mechanics'
liens seems tenuous to say the least. In a problem such as this, how-
ever. every point should be considered; and it seems that possibly
the framers of the Colorado Constitution, while feeling that the
homestead was of sufficient importance to require a specific provi-
:. Woodward v. People's Nat'l Bank, 2 Colo. App. 369, 31 Pac. 184 (1892).
::4 Barnett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 Pac. 747 (1884).
:.-- See note 33 supra.
::6 See, e.g., Tyler v. Jewett, 82 Ala. 93, 2 So. 905 (1887); McAnally v. Hawkins Lumber Co.,
109 Alo. 397, 19 So. 417 (1896); Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475, 5 S.W. 799 (1887); Murray
v. Ropley, 30 Ark. 568 (1881); Parsons v. Pearson, 9 Wash. 48, 36 Pac. 974 (1894).
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sion in the Constitution, felt that the mechanics' lien was not of the
same importance.
2. Statutory Provisions.
Basically the Colorado statutes give the mechanic, materialman,
etc., a lien upon property upon which they have bestowed labor or
for which they have furnished materials equal to the value of such
labor or material." One statutory provision which seems to have a
possible connection with the instant problem is the section regard-
ing priority of lien and attachment.-", Some of the more important
provisions of this section are that:
(1) All liens established by virtue of the mechanics' lien sta-
tutes relate back to the time of the commencement of the
work or the furnishing of the materials.
(2) All such liens have priority over any and every lien or
encumbrance subsequently intervening, and,
(3) Nothing in the mechanics' lien laws should be construed
as impairing any valid encumbrance already existing at
the time the lien relates back to.
The first and second of these have greater application to the second
of the posed problems. In the first problem the time of attachment
of the mechanics' lien is not important; whether it will attach at
all is the important consideration.
The third point, however, seems to be of some importance when
one considers that courts sometimes classify the homestead exemp-
tion as a lien or encumbrance on the property.1 t Therefore, if one
considers the homestead as a lien ,4 it seems it could be argued that
the mechanics' lien could not impair that lien. Of course, it could
also be argued that the legislature did not intend this type of lien
but rather the conventional type of lien. At any rate this does not
appear to offer a clear-cut answer.
Other provisions of the mechanics' lien statute which might
offer some indication of a solution are those sections relating to the
procedure to perfect such liens and to satisfy such judgments. One
section prescribes a procedure for summons, hearing, etc., wherein
an actual judgment is rendered establishing such lien.41 Another
section prescribes that satisfaction of these judgments shall be ob-
tained in the manner provided for sales of real estate on execution
issued out of any court of record. 42 The importance of these provi-
sions is that they seem to tie in the idea that an actual judgment
must be rendered and that foreclosure of such follows the same
rules as other judgments. Therefore, it seems arguable that a judg-
ment of a mechanics' lien stands in no better position than any
other judgment and thus must be subject to a valid homestead
exemption.
The mechanics' lien laws, like the homestead laws, contain no
exception in favor of the homestead. Whether the absence of an
exception in the mechanics' lien statutes carries the same import
1,7 Colo. Rev. Stat. 86-3-1 (1953).
1' Coo. Rev. Stat. 86-3-6 (1953).
:1.) E.g. Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 246 P.2d 894 (1952); Union Nat'l Bank v.
Wright, 78 Colo. 346, 242 Pac. 54 (1925), where it was held that in estate proceedings, the home-
stead is a lien on the home to which an heir or devisee succeeding to the title takes subiect.
4() This appears questionable since, as was pointed out before, the homestead seems to defy
accurate classification for all purposes.
41 Colo. Rev. Stat. ' 86-3-13 (1953).
4" Cola Rev. Stat. § 86-3-14 (1953).
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as the absence of an exception in the homestead statutes seems open
to question. Here again we have various words, phrases, etc., that
seem either to favor or to disfavor the superiority of the mechanics'
lien over the homestead. Again, there is no clear-cut answer.
C. The General Rule
The general rule for the situation posed in problem No. 1 is
easily found but actually is of little help. It was accurately stated
as far back as 1918, when it was declared that "the right to a me-
chanics' lien upon a homestead is governed almost exclusively by
a statutory or constitutional provision, or both. The contemporary
constitutional and statutory provisions should therefore be con-
sulted in any investigation of this question. '43 Some authorities
have been content merely to state the general rule and then give
some examples of constitutional or statutory provisions and their
effects on the decision. A typical example of this is a statement to
the effect that "under some constitutional and statutory provisions
property held exempt from ordinary debts as a homestead is not
subject to a mechanics' lien . . ." and next it is stated, "on the other
hand, under other constitutions and statutes, such homestead prop-
erty is subject to a mechanics' lien the same as other property . . .41
A few authorities go farther than this and declare not only the
standard general rule regarding the constitutional and statutory
provisions but attempt to formulate a rule for situations in which
it is not clearly expressed in the constitution or statutes whether
there is an exception of one or the other. These authorities are, how-
ever, not only few in number, but seem to be fairly evenly divided
as to what the rule should be. William M. Rockel in his treatise on
mechanics' liens says, "Homesteads and exempted property under
homestead laws are liable the same as other property, the law deem-
ing it more equitable to protect the man who puts his labor or
money into the property, than to preserve it for the family. 4 - He
fur'her states that "the intent to exempt this property from the op-
eration of the mechanics' lien law must be expressly declared by
the statute or the constitution. '46 Another authority says "where a
lien is given on 'all buildings' and there is nothing in the homestead
or other acts exempting it, the property will be liable to this lien."4
4:: Annot., 1918D L.R.A. 1055.
44 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 14 (1948).
4.7, Rockel, Mechanics' Liens 22 (1909).
4-; Id. at 10.
47 Phillips, Mechanics' Liens § 183a (2d ed. 1883).
KELLY GIRLS * Skilled * Tested * Bonded
Experienced Office Girls to Meet All Law Office Needs
ON YOUR STAFF e ON OUR PAYROLL
- IN DENVER
IN COLORADO SPRINGS 292-2920 * IN GREELEY
633-7646 900 Petroleum Club Bldg. ELgin 2-5922
1963
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
The contrary opinion has been declared by other authorities,
however, equally confident of their correctness. After stating the
general rule as explained above, the author of an annotation on this
subject said "where there is a general exemption of homesteads in
order that the homestead be subject to a mechanics' or material-
mans' lien, there must be some provision taking such liens out of
the exemption; in the absence of such a provision the homestead is
not subject to the lien. '48 This author was not a voice alone, for we
find others expressing this same truism. "Where the statute creating
the homestead exemption contains no exception in favor of me-
chanics, there can be no mechanics' lien on a homestead.
49
Upon final analysis of the views of these authorities on this
subject little can be said but that they are very definitely in con-
flict. Further analysis, which will be accomplished later in this
article, of the cases upon which these authorities base their opinions
will perhaps draw them closer together. Even then, however, com-
plete accord appears impossible.
D. Other States
A brief discussion of the constitutional and statutory provisions
of other states seems to be in order at this point.50 Twenty-eight
states have a constitutional provision for a homestead exemption or
something similar.5 1 Of those twenty-eight, eighteen have very
specific provisions regarding the homestead. These provisions in-
clude the value, size, exactly what the homestead is or is not exempt
from and various other details regarding the homestead. Seven
states have a general provision which designates that the legislature
shall recognize the right of a debtor 52 or that the legislature shall
provide for the exemption of a reasonable amount of real prop-
erty.53 Two other states have the same provision as Colorado. 4
Of these same twenty-eight states, seventeen have a limitation
of some sort imposed on the exemption. This limitation is either in
the same provision or in an accompanying one. Ten of these states
have specific exceptions in favor of the mechanics' and material-
mens' liens. Six have an express exception in favor of only me-
chanics or laborers. However, on occasion courts have implied the
exception for the materialmen in these provisions.5 5 One state
merely has a provision stating that the legislature can provide for
waiver, alienation, and encumbrance of the homestead.56 Neither
of the states which have similar provisions to Colorado's have ex-
ceptions in their constitutions.
Forty-four states have some kind of a statutory provision for
the homestead exemption. Again, these do not always call the ex-
emption a homestead by name but rather may merely designate it
as an exemption for real property. Thirty-four of these states have
an express exception in favor of the mechanics' and materialmen's
liens. This exception is sometimes in the homestead section and
48See note 43 supra.
49 Boisot, Mechanics' Liens 136 (1897).
50 For a detailed analysis of the provisions of the states, see Appendices A and B.
51 Some states do not call the exemption a homestead, but merely call it an exemption of real
property.
52 See, e.g., Indiona, Appendix A.
53 See, e.g., Maryland, Appendix A.
54 Montana and Illinois.
55 See, e.g., Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475, 5 S.W. 799 (1887).
56 See, e.g., Ga., Appendix A.
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sometimes in the mechanics' lien section. 7 In those states which
do not expressly except the materialman, the courts have usually
implied such an exception.58 Four states which do not have a statu-
tory exception in favor of the mechanics' liens have a constitutional
exception. One state has an exception stated in the mechanics' lien
laws running in favor of the homestead.19 Both states which have a
provision similar to that of Colorado, have a statutory exception
for the mechanics' lien.
Of the forty-six states which have a homestead or similar provi-
sion in either the constitution or statutes, there are only five which
do not have a stated exception in either the constitution or stat-
utes."" Decisions in these states which might be relevant to a solu-
tion to this problem will be discussed in the next section.
It is difficult to say whether these statistics indicate any actual
solution to the problem. The statistics do seem, at least, to point out
the advisability of enacting a statute declaring that the exception
either does or does not exist. It also seems possible to reason that
since so many states have exceptions in favor of the mechanics'
liens, apparently they felt it was necessary to enact a statute to that
effect and that otherwise the mechanics' lien would not be superior
to the homestead. South Dakota seemed to feel the opposite was
necessary, i.e., that the mechanics' lien was not superior. In view of
South Dakota's case history on this point, which will be discussed
later, this is understandable and does not detract from the idea
that if there is going to be an exception, either the constitution
must be amended or a law passed to that effect.
E. Cases and Reasoning
A study of the cases on this problem necessarily includes con-
sideration of the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
It would be helpful, of course, if some state had the exact or even
similar constitutional and statutory provisions as Colorado. Unfor-
tunately this is not the case.
As was pointed out in the preceding section, some states have
detailed constitutional provisions for the homestead exemption.61
In some of those provisions is a stated exception in favor of persons
with liens for improvements.62 There seems to be no question in
such a situation but that there is a legitimate exception in favor of
the mechanics' lien.
In other states, however, there is no stated exception in the
constitution. In some of these states the legislatures have attempted
to provide such an exception by statute.1 3 It appears that whenever
this was questioned the statutory exception was held invalid.6" An
attempt to enact this type of legislation brought about an interest-
ing sequence of events in South Dakota. Originally the homestead
in South Dakota was specifically stated to be subject to a mechan-
ics' lien. Later the homestead law was amended, and the South
Dakota Supreme Court held that the amendment, being repugnant
57 See, 'e.g., Vt., Appendix B, "This chapter shall apply to homesteads."
5 See, e.g., Banner v. Minnier, 13 Mont. 269, 34 Pac. 30 (1893).
59 S. D., S.D.C. 39-0702 (1939).
60 Colo., N. Y., Mo., Utah and Mass.
61 See, e.g., Fla., Appendix A.
62 Ibid.
63 S.D., Ill., Minn., Ind., Md., Wisc. and Utah have attempted this.
64 This question was raised in Minn., S.D., and Utah.
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to the clause subjecting homesteads to mechanics' liens, by implica-
tion repealed the clause 5 Even later the homestead laws were
again amended so that the homestead was to be subject to the me-
chanics' lien. This was in turn questioned, and the court followed
the earlier case and held this provision to be unconstitutional and
void.6 6 Subsequent efforts to amend the constitution were unsuc-
cessful. Finally the South Dakota Legislature, apparently convinced
that any further efforts to subject the homestead to a mechanics'
lien would be unsuccessful, decided to clarify the whole situation
and passed a statute declaring that the mechanics' lien does not ex-
tend to nor affect the homestead. 7
Minnesota was somewhat more successful in dealing with the
problem. Like South Dakota, the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Coleman v. Ballandi s declared that any change in the homestead
laws would have to come by constitutional amendment. Unlike
South Dakota, the Minnesota Legislature was able to enact such an
amendment.69
A third state where the question arose was Utah. There, in
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, 7 the court held a statute
which proposed to subject the homestead to a mechanics' lien to be
unconstitutional and void. These appear to be the only states where
such legislation has been questioned.
Another approach that has been applied successfully in a few
instances is to subject the homestead to a mechanics' lien by im-
plication. While generally this approach has been unsuccessful, it
has worked and apparently is still the law in Missouri.71 This same
theory was applied in Kentucky prior to the enactment of a statute
subjecting the homestead to the operation of the mechanics' lien.
In Robards v. Robards '7 2 the court said, "Assuming that the allega-
tions of appellant in regard to her claim of homestead were suffi-
cient, we do not think she was entitled to it as against the claim of
appellee. Having induced him to improve the land, and then (as he
contended) violated the contract to convey, she cannot defeat his
lien for the enhanced value of the land by her claim of homestead."'
It appears somewhat questionable whether the court was applying
a principle of implied exception or estoppel. This approach was also
successful in a South Carolina case where a homestead was held to
be subject to execution for a mechanics' lien even though the sta-
tute granting the right to enforce such a lien was not passed until
after the creation of the lien.
7 3
The cases holding such an exception to be implied seem to be
decidely in the minority. An Oregon court in holding that it would
not imply such an exception said that "if the homestead laws con-
tain no exception in favor of debts created in making improvements,
the court can make none; and the homestead is liable only for such
65 O'Leary v. Croghan, 42 S.D. 210, 173 N.W. 844 (1919). where the court held that any change
in the homestead law would have to come by constitutional amendment.
66 Home Lumber Co. v. Heckel, 67 S.D. 429, 293 N.W. 549 (1940). It is interesting to note that
in this case the homestead was asserted against the builder of the house. The fact that S.D. requires
only intent to occupy, if manifested to the builder, made this possible.
67 S. D., S.D.C. 39.0707 (1939).
6i 22 Minn. 144 (1875).
(;' Minn. Const. art. I, Sec. 12.
71) 32 Utah 74, 88 Pac. 896 (1907).
71 Kansas City Granite v. Jordan, 316 Mo. 1118, 295 S.W. 763 (1927).
72 27 Ky. L. Rep. 494, 85 S.W. 718 (1905).
73 Allen v. Harley, 3 S.C. 412 (1862).
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a lien when the exemption is waived in favor of it, which must be
by the signature of the husband and wife to the contract. 7 4 Other
states have followed this reasoning. South Dakota, while holding
one of the statutes unconstitutional and void, went further and re-
fused to imply the exception.7a Michigan, before it enacted a statu-
tory exception, refused to imply one in Burtch v. McGibbon.7
Other states have applied a limited form of this implication
theory. That is, in several states there were stated exceptions, but
only in favor of mechanics and laborers. The question arose when
a materialman claimed a lien on the homestead. The courts seem to
be fairly well split on this question. In a Montana case, the court
held the materialman to be impliedly included in the exception.
7 7
A California court held otherwise than in the above Montana case,
holding that their statute was not as broad as the Montana statute
and did not include one furnishing material.7 s In states where only
a statutory homestead provision exists, there seems to be no diffi-
culty in enacting another statute excepting the mechanics' liens.
7
1
Other theories have emerged in various cases regarding the
homestead as a subject of the mechanics' lien. It has been held that
the equity of a mechanic is similar to that of a vendor.," This theory
was advanced by Thompson in his work on homesteads and exemp-
tions, where he said that there is no difference in principle between
a debt due to A, who has provided me with the land on which I
have erected my building, and a debt due to B, who has furnished
the materials to build it, and a debt due to C, whose labor has built
it." Other courts have used the estoppel principle to hold the home-
stead subject to a mechanics' lien.12 Still others require the signa-




McPhee v. O'Rourke14 seems to be the only Colorado case in
which both the homestead and mechanics' lien were mentioned in
74 Davis v. Low, 66 Ore. 599, 135 Pac. 314 (1913).
75 Fallihee v. Wittmayer, 9 S.D. 479, 70 N.W. 642 (1897).
7698 Mich. 139, 56 N.W. 1110 (1893).
77 Bonner v. Minnear, 13 Mont. 269, 34 Poc. 30 (1893).
78 Richards v. Shear, 70 Cal. 187, 11 Pac. 607 (1886).
791 There are presently 12 states which have no constitutional exception for the mechanics' lien
but do have both a statutory provision fo the homestead and a statutory exception in favor of
the mechanics' lien.
SO Hill v. LaCrosse & Mil. R.R., 14 Wis. 315 (1861).
.q t Thompson, Homestead and Exemption Laws, Sec. 312 (1878).
.'- Jensen v. Griffin, 41 S.D. 30, 168 N.W. 764; 46 S.D. 55, 190 N.W. 319 (1922).
S3 See Mich. Compiled Laws of 1948 Sec. 26.282.
,S4 McPhee v. O'Rourke, 10 Colo. 301, 15 Pac. 420 (1887).
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the same case. The only difficulty is that there was actually no
mechanics' lien filed. In this case McPhee, the materialman, fur-
nished materials used in improvements on the property. McPhee
did not comply with the mechanics' lien laws and hence had no me-
chanics' lien. He did bring suit on the debt for the materials and
obtained a judgment prior to the filing of a homestead. One of the
questions before the court was whether the act of designating the
property as a homestead should operate against a debt for materials
used in improvements on the property before it was so designated.
To this the court answered, "it is sufficient to say that there is no
proviso in the statute against such operation. By failing to take the
steps necessary to secure a lien upon the premises, under the pro-
visions of our mechanics' lien act the right to subject the premises
to such debt was lost." It must be noted, however, that a mechanics'
lien was not filed, and any statement regarding the filing of a me-
chanics' lien is necessarily dictum. It must also be noted that in
the McPhee case the homestead was filed prior to attachment.
Whether the court was hinting that a mechanics' lien would be
superior regardless of time or that, in this case, it would be superior
since it would have been prior to the homestead seems to be ques-
tionable. The question of whether it really would have been prior
in time will be discussed in the analysis of the second problem. At
any rate, exactly why the filing of a mechanics' lien would have
made McPhee's position better does not seem clear.
Other Colorado cases have dealt with various types of liens
attaching to the homestead. The general rule usually applied is that
"in a conflict between a homestead entry claimant and another
lienor, the controlling factor, as we perceive the revelation, is that
if the lien which the homestead entryman would supplant precedes
in time of record and is specific and definite as to the property in-
volved, it holds its preference."' 5 This, of course, is the same rule
consistently applied by the Colorado Supreme Court when consider-
ing the superiority of a judgment lien over the homestead. That is,
until there is an actual levy, the lien is not specific and will not
operate against a homestead which was filed after judgment but
prior to levy.," The real question here, however, seems never to
have been raised. That is, even if the homestead is declared long
prior to the supplying of labor and materials, will the mechanics'
lien be superior by reason of implied exception, estoppel, equity,
etc., or are the mechanic and materialman on the same footing as
the other creditors?
Other decisions in Colorado relate primarily to the question of
priority in time. The question of the equities of particular liens
does not seem to have been raised. Thus far the only lien given
priority based on its nature is the vendor's lien, and that is done by
statute.8 7 This in itself may provide argument for the superiority of
the homestead. That is, had the legislature felt the mechanics' lien
claimants were entitled to greater rights than other lien claimants
they would have so provided.
85 Bean v. Eves, 92 Colo. 339, 20 P.2d 544 (1933).
86 Barnett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 Pac. 747 (1884).
87 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-7 (1953).
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G. Conclusion on Problem No. 1
In coming to some conclusion on this problem, it is perhaps wise
to consider some of the arguments raised earlier in this paper. There
seems to be nothing in the wording of the statutes which would,
beyond any question, dictate an answer. Both statutes have provi-
sions which seem possibly to exclude the other. The homestead ap-
plies to all debts, contracts, and civil obligations. This would seem
to include mechanics' liens. The mechanics' lien laws do not except
the homestead from its operation. However, the mechanics' lien
must come to judgment and attach the same as other judgments.
Therefore, why should it be different from other judgments? The
general rule as mentioned earlier offers little help.
Cases from other states, however, seem to offer some help; but
it must be remembered that none of the other states have the same
constitutional and statutory provisions as Colorado. Some have im-
plied the exception for a mechanics' lien, and some have not. Those
states where the exception could not be implied and could not even
be enacted into the statutes probably carry little weight, as the con-
stitutional provision in each case was very specific and explicit. As
was stated, any change would have to come by constitutional
amendment.
Colorado cases seem to be of little, if any, help. The McPhee
case could perhaps be used in argument for both sides. However, it
seems to be a better argument for the superiority of the homestead
if filed prior to the furnishing of materials.
The statistics of what other states have done also seems to carry
some weight for the homestead. However, this could be discounted
somewhat by South Dakota's precedent of excepting the homestead
from the operation of the mechanics' lien and also because many
states have exceptions in their constitution and were merely fol-
lowing the mandate of the constitution when passing an exception
statute.
Then, of course, arguments, and seemingly strong arguments,
can be made from the policies and purposes underlying both sta-
tutes. On the mechanics' lien side, estoppel often enters the picture.
Implied exception usually arises here also. On the homestead side
there is the age-old and very strong principle of preserving the
family home. Another consideration that perhaps warrants men-
tioning is that the homestead entryman is often not the villain in
the picture. More often than not, the small contractor, who is the
homeowner's agent by reason of our mechanics' lien law, is the
person who was paid by the homeowner and suddenly found him-
self without funds. In such a case, which of the two innocent parties
should bear the loss? To this writer, the equities and arguments
appear to be in favor of the homestead.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND PROBLEM
A. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
These provisions are, of course, the same. Some of the particular
sections of the statutes will be more important, but the inquiry is
directed to the same two statutory rights.
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B. New Elements
Two new elements come into play at this point. First, there is
the relation back theory of the mechanics' lien. That is, the Colo-
rado statute provides that all liens established by virtue of the me-
chanics' lien laws shall relate back to the time of the commence-
ment of work under the contract, or if the contract be not in writ-
ing to the time of the commencement of the work upon the struc-
ture or improvement.8 8 As far as the materialman is concerned it
has been held that the date of the lien relates back to the time the
first of the materials were furnished.8 9 The other new element that
comes into play is the judicial construction of the homestead law
to the effect that the homestead is valid against judgment liens if
entered before the lien becomes specific, i.e., before a levy of an
execution or attachment."
These new elements in conjunction with the assumption that
the homestead is superior to the mechanics' lien, if filed before the
mechanics' lien is perfected and foreclosed on, bring about the new
problem. At what point in time will the designation of the land as
a homestead defeat the operation of the mechanics' lien? More spe-
cifically, does the relation back theory cause the mechanics' lien to
defeat a homestead entry which was recorded subsequent to the
commencement of the work but before actual levy on the property?
Here again the particular wording of the statutes is important.
It appears from the wording of the mechanics' lien statutes that the
lien would attach as of the date when the work was commenced or
the material was furnished and would operate against the home-
stead. However, there still seems to be some question due to the fact
that the statute says that the mechanics' lien relates back to that
date and "shall have priority over any and every lien or encum-
brance subsequently intervening."' 1 Does it then relate back only
as against other liens or also for the purpose of defeating a possible
claim of homestead?
C. The General Rule
The general rule appears to be highly in favor of the mechanics'
lien in a problem such as this. Very positive statements have been
made to this effect. In 18 Ruling Case Law, in a discussion on the
homestead as a subject of the mechanics' lien, the author said,
"Some of the states allow the right to a lien, while others deny it;
but even under the rule of absolute exemption an existing mechan-
ics' lien or one which is inchoate by virtue of a contract to supply
materials, etc., cannot be defeated by the subsequent acquisition of
a homestead in the property."92
In Corpus Juris it is stated that "while in some jurisdictions
the rule is otherwise, or at least subject to limitations or modifica-
tions, the general rule is that the exemption cannot be claimed as
against valid liens which have attached to the premises before they
are impressed with the homestead character, whether such liens
88 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3-6 (1953).
89 Meller v. Valentine, 3 Colo. 255 (1877).
90 Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Francis, 78 Colo. 204, 240 Pac. 945 (1925); Edson-Keith Co. v. Bedwell,
52 Colo. 310, 122 Pac. 392 (1912); Weare v. Johnson, 20 Colo. 363, 38 Pac. 374 (1894); Woodward
v. People's Nat'l Bank, 2 Colo. App. 369, 31 Pac. 184 (1892).
91 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3-6 (1953).
92 18 R.C.L. 888.
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are obtained by contract or operation of law." 3 This article goes
on to say that the rule has been applied in case of liens created by
mechanics' liens.24 As a further indication of the superiority of the
mechanics' lien it is stated in Corpus Juris Secundum, that "the
question whether particular property is a homestead, with respect
to such a lien, is generally determined as of the time of the making
of the contract under which the labor was performed or the mate-
rials were furnished. . ..- ' In light of some of the Colorado deci-
sions this, in itself, practically answers the question.
D. Other State Decisions
The case law is almost universally behind the rule that sub-
sequent acquisition of a homestead will not defeat a mechanics' lien.
This rule was announced in Evans v. Jensen,6 where the court de-
clared that notwithstanding the constitutional provision that the
"legislature shall provide by law for selection by each head of a
family an exemption of a homestead . . . from sale on execution,"
a pre-existing mechanics' lien is not affected by the subsequent
acquisition of a homestead right in the property. In Davies-Hender-
son Lumber Co. v. Gottschalk17 the theory of relation back was
used as an alternative basis for the decision in favor of the mechan-
ics' lien. In that case the defendant argued that, as the law stood
at the time the material was furnished, a claim for material could
no' attach to a homestead. The court held that a complete answer
to this contention was that the lien must be held to relate to the
time of furnishing the material, and at that time the homestead was
not in existence.
One case stands out strongly in favor of the homestead in this
type of situation, but it stands nearly alone. The court in this case
appears to base its opinion primarily on the procedure required to
foreclose on a mechanics' lien. In declaring the homestead to be
superior, the court said "it is still necessary to foreclose such a lien
by suit in which a decree is rendered as in other suits for such pur-
poses. The decree thus rendered is not different from others in its
effect upon the property, and there being no exception in the home-
stead laws in favor of such determination, it affects them in the
-:3 29 C.J. Homesteads § 202 (1922).
1)4 Id. at Sec. 202.
',557 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 14 (1948).
9651 Utah 1, 168 Pac. 762 (1917).
07 81 Cal. 641, 22 Pac. 860 (1889).
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same manner as in other judgments or decrees. The operation of
the statute under consideration is not to impair the lien, but only
to suspend its execution, and then only at the claim of the owner
of the homestead."
9 8
Another case which speaks for the homestead is Walsh v. Mc-
Menomy.99 In this case work was done and material was furnished.
Subsequently, but before judgment, a homestead was declared. At
that time California had excepted mechanics and laborers from the
homestead exemption but not materialmen. However, by statute
the materialman's lien related back. In this case the court held that
a subsequent acquisition of a homestead would defeat the material-
man's lien. As was mentioned before, these cases seem to constitute
a definite minority.
E. Colorado cases
Colorado cases shed some light on this problem, and seem to
favor the mechanics' lien. Some weight, however, is cast in the di-
rection of the homestead by cases speaking of the purpose of the
designation of a homestead. It has been held that the causing of
"homestead" to be entered in the margin was not for "the purpose
of giving notice and securing protection to those dealing with the
householder and extending credit to him."'1 0 Therefore it seems
arguable that the mechanic is not warranted in relying on the debt-
or's declining to avail himself of the homestead privilege. However,
later in the same case the court held that "the householder is in
ample time if he records the election before a lien attaches in favor
of his creditor."'' 1 (Emphasis supplied.)
The last statement quoted along with the statement of the court
in Trich v. Norton 0 2 that "the lien of the mechanic or materialman
begins with the commencement of the work or the furnishing of
the material under his express or implied contract with his em-
ployer, and attaches upon whatever estate the latter may have at
the commencement of such work, or the furnishing of mate-
rials, . . ." seems to make the position of the homestead claimant
nearly untenable.
Other cases however still raise some question. For example, it
has been held that in order to declare priority of a lien over the
homestead entry, the land must have been subjected to the lien
prior to the assertion of the homestead.'0 ' The question is, what
does the court mean by "subjected to"?
The case which seems to establish the superiority of the me-
chanic in a problem like this is McPhee v. O'Rourke.'1 4 This case
was discussed to a certain extent in the analysis of the first prob-
lem. To review the facts briefly the more important points are that
no mechanics' lien was filed, judgment was obtained for material
furnished, and a homestead was filed subsequent to the time of fur-
nishing the material. The critical words were uttered regarding the
question of whether a homestead should operate against a claim for
material used in improvements before the property was designated
9., Joh,-on .. Tucker, 85 Ore. 646, 167 Pac. 787 (1917).
99 74 Col. 356, 16 Pac. 17 (1887).
10 Barrett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 Pac. 747 (1884).
101 Id. at 369. 3 Pac. at 748.
102 10 Colo. 337, 15 Pac. 680 (1887).
103 Howell v. Burch Warehouse & Transfer Co., 100 Colo. 247, 67 P.2d 73 (1937).
104 McPhee v. O'Rourke, 10 Colo. 301, 15 Pac. 420 (1887).
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as a homestead. The court's reply was in the affirmative, saying that
"by failing to take the steps necessary to secure a lien upon the
premises, under the provisions of our mechanics' lien act, the right
to subject the premises to such debt was lost." The question which
was raised earlier regarding this statement was whether it was
indicating that a mechanics' lien would be superior to a homestead
whenever the homestead was filed or whether it was indicating that
in this case it would be sufficient since the relation back theory
would cause the lien to ante date the designation of the homestead.
However, it seems that whatever the court was indicating is of little
concern regarding this problem since either construction would
cause the homestead to be subject to the mechanics' lien whenever
the homestead was subsequently acquired.
The only thing that detracts from the overwhelming weight of
this case in favor of the mechanics' lien in the second problem is
that the statement quoted was dictum since no mechanics' lien was
ever filed. However, this would not seem likely to detract much.
F. Conclusion on Second Problem
Various points have been raised to favor either the mechanics'
lien or the homestead. The strongest points for the homestead seem
to be that:
1. The statute and the cases say that the mechanics' lien relates
back for the purpose of establishing priority of the lien over
other liens and encumbrances. This leaves the question of
whether the homestead is a lien or encumbrance.
2. The purpose of making a marginal entry is not to give a
potential creditor notice and, any creditor deals with the
debtor knowing that the debtor can avail himself of the
homestead privilege any time before actual and specific levy
of an execution or attachment.
3. As stated in the Oregon case 0 5 the mechanics' lien must be
foreclosed on in the same manner as other decrees. There-
fore, it could be argued that as against a homestead the
mechanics' lien is the same as any other judgment.
The points which seem to favor the mechanics' lien are:
1. Most of the authorities flatly state that subsequent acquisi-
tion of a homestead will not defeat the mechanics' lien.
2. The majority of the states have held the mechanics' lien
superior in such cases.
3. The Colorado cases seem to indicate that the mechanics' lien
actually attaches as of the date of commencement of work
and furnishing of materials.
4. The McPhee case'0 6 seems to establish that, for whatever
reason, the homestead would not be superior.
To this writer not only the reasoning but the equities seem to favor
the mechanic in a case such as this.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this article to bring to light unsolved
questions which seem to exist regarding two statutory rights. It
may be asked why these questions have not been raised before.
10.5 See note 98 supro.
106 See note 104 supro.
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There are several possible reasons. One reason might be that in
order for either of these problems to arise it takes a particular fact-
ual situation which might not often occur. There has to be a low
valuation on the house since the homestead exemption only extends
to $5,000.00. Also, it would have to be an addition rather than the
original construction. Another possible reason is that there is often
not enough money involved to warrant an appeal. Finally, it seems
likely that if much money is involved, bank financing would be re-
quired and this would nearly always include a written waiver of
the homestead exemption.
Whatever the reason the questions seem never to have reached
the Colorado Supreme Court. If and when they do, it appears that
at least the first of the two problems will require a great deal of
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OWNERSHIP OF STREETS AND RIGHTS OF
ABUTTING LANDOWNERS IN COLORADO
By MARSHALL DEE BIESTERFELD*
Streets, highways and roads are designed to allow free, con-
tinuous, convenient passage across the land of others. The passage
is a necessity. Strips of land are placed under control and supervi-
sion of public authorities who are given the duty of keeping the
roadways unobstructed for the good of the public.
The abutting landowner is peculiarly situated in that he not
only uses the streets in common with the general public but also
uses the specific portion of the street abutting his land as an ease-
ment of access. A natural place to lodge limited control over the
actions of the public authorities is in the abutting landowner the
courts have done just this. They have given the abutting landowner
special rights.
Fine distinctions have been pronounced as to the nature of the
title in the public and in the abutting landowner. Elimination of
these has been suggested,' but a definite tendency of the court has
been to uphold the importance of the distinctions. Colorado has,
upon occasion, been unique in its decisions, and for this reason alone
the subject is worthy of inspection.
2
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF STREETS
Public streets can come into existence in several ways. The
object is to place land in the possession and control of public au-
thorities so that it can be maintained and kept free from obstruc-
tion. The two most common methods3 by which streets come into
the hands of the authorities are statutory dedications and common
law dedications. Other methods are prescription, condemnation or




Early Colorado statutes required for a successful statutory de-
dication, an accurate plat signed, acknowledged and filed with the
county clerk and city clerk. That plat had to be recorded by the
county clerk with his certificate. Fulfilling these requirements
would vest the streets in the city, in trust for public uses.3
Those have been repealed and stree's become vested in the city
through the procedures for incorporation which include presenting
a petition with an accurate plat, holding an election, making return
of election to the court and electing officersY
* Senior student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 30.37 (3d ed. 1950) quoting from Lewis, Eminent
Domain.
2 All cases were read and are noted in text or footnotes that are digested in West's Colorado
Digest under Municipal Corporations, Key Numbers 646 through 698. Certain other cases pertirent
to this paper may be found under the topics Dedication and Highways.
3 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 33.01 (3d ed. 1950).
4 An act of Congress is also a method of creating a public highway: "The right of way for
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted."
Rev. Stat. § 2477 (1875), 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1958).
5 These statutes can be found in Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 163, §§ 152 to 159 (1935).
6 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 139-1-1 to 139-1-9 (1953), as amended, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 139-1.3,5 (Supp.
1960). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-1 (1953) for dedications as county highways.
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The Colorado Supreme Court has often said that a statutory
dedication will be successful only if in strict compliance with the
statutes. 7 A statutory dedication will fail, at least against a pur-
chaser of the land without notice, where the plat and notes do not
describe the road as running through the land purchased.8 A dedica-
tion has failed because the acceptance did not get the required
number of votes in the city council. 9 Lack of acknowledgment of
the plat can invalidate the statutory dedication.' 0 As will be dis-
cussed infra, the ownership of the street is altered by these failures.
A statutory dedication operates by way of grant. A common law
dedication operates by way of estoppel in pais.1" The dedication
must be express when statutory and can be either express or im-
plied when at common law. The statutory dedication will usually
vest an estate in some type of fee simple,' 2 whereas the common
law dedication gives the public an easement.
Often the failure of a statutory dedication will result in a valid
common law dedication because of the relative simplicity of the
latter.13 However, neither may result. An individual prevailed when
he purchased without notice of the existence of a road because re-
cording mistakes made the statutory dedication invalid. The evid-
ence did not show any public travel along the line of the road, and
the purchaser had done nothing from which to imply an intent to
dedicate.1
4
B. Common Law Dedication
A frequent act that results in a common law dedication is sell-
ing lots with reference to a plat. The Colorado Supreme Court has
several times'; recognized the rule as stated in Angell on Highways:
In this country there is quite a large class of cases in
which dedication has been inferred from the sale of land,
described by reference to a map or plat, in which the same
is designated as laid off into lots, intersected by streets and
alleys. It may be stated as a general rule, that where the
owner of urban property, who has laid it off into lots, with
streets, avenues and alleys intersecting the same, sells his
lots with reference to a plat, in which the same is so laid
off, he adopts such map by sales with reference thereto, his
acts will amount to a dedication of the designated streets,
avenues and alleys to the public.'
Correctly speaking, however, Colorado follows the general rule
that the sale of lots with reference to a plat is only an offer to de-
dicate; the acceptance by the city is necessary to complete the de-
dication, and the grantee of the lots has no right against the city
7 City of Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co., 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906); John Mouat
Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac, 237 (1895); City of Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo.
472 (1877).
S Lieber v. People, 33 Colo. 493, 81 Poc. 270 (1905).
9 City of Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co., 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906).
10 Town of Center v. Collier, 26 Colo. App. 354, 144 Poc. 1123 (1914).
11 City of Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co., 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906); City of Denver
v. Clements, 3 Colo. 472 (1877).
12 Brell v. Town of Ovid, 88 Colo. 198, 293 Pac. 961 (1930) concerns a dedication under present
statutes.
13 See note 7 supra.
14 See note 8 supro.
15 John Mouat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac. 237 (1895); Ward v. Farwell,
6 Colo. 66 (1881); City of Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 472 (1877).
16 Angell, Highways § 149 (3d ed. 1886).
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until that acceptance.' 7 This is not a universal rule. Some jurisdic-
tions hold that the grantee has rights against the city in that this
method of dedication is completed with the sale. The rule's justi-
fication rests in the reliance of the grantee upon the representation
that streets are present.'" In every case the grantee has a private
easement he can enforce against the grantor."t
A common law dedication can arise by offering either expressly
or impliedly to dedicate certain land to the public for street pur-
poses. More controversy naturally arises over the issue of implied
dedication. In Starr v. People,20 the court set down rules to govern
the finding of an implied dedication:
In an action of this kind a dedication may be implied:
1. When it is satisfactorily proved that it was the
owner's intention to set apart the land occupied as a road,
to the use of the public as a highway, and that there has
been an acceptance by the public of the land for such use;
2. The evidence of intent must consist of such acts or
declarations by the owner as clearly and unequivocally in-
dicate his purpose to make the dedication, or such conduct
on his part as equitably estops him from denying such in-
tention;
3. The acts and declarations of the owner connected
with the matter of the alleged dedication may be given in
evidence in his favor;
4. The line of the road must be certain and definite; a
general privilege or license by the owner to cross his lands,
without reference to any special route, will not suffice;
5. User of the road by the public for a considerable
length of time without objection by the owner of the land
may increase the weight of the evidence, if any there be,
arising from acts or declarations of the owner indicating his
intent to dedicate. But mere user, without such acts or de-
clarations, unless for a period of time corresponding to the
statutory limitation of real actions, cannot be held suffici-
ent to vest the easement in the public, as by prescription.
2'
In Mitchell v. City of Denver,'2 2 even though the city, six or
seven years before the trial, had graded the street and put up sign
posts and street names, there was no implied dedication because of
lack of evidence of intent where the owner had platted the area
but had reserved the strip in question for private use for itself, its
successors and assigns.
The Colorado court, in the Starr case ,23 refused to find an im-
plied dedication where the road passing through the placer mining
claim was used by the public. The line of the road was moved sev-
eral times as the owner "washed" the gravel for mineral, and the
public authorities made some repairs but without being so induced
by the owner, and the owner had refused to allow any road to be
used except as might be convenient to him at the time.
17 John Movat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac. 237 (1895); City of Denver v.
Clements, 3 Colo. 472 (1877).
1 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 33.45 (3d ed. 1950).
19 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 33.24 ,3d ed. 1950); Note, 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 88 (1960).
20 17 Colo. 458, 30 Pac. 64 (1892).
21 Id. at 460, 30 Pac. at 65.
22 33 Colo. 37, 78 Pac. 686 (1904).
23 Starr v. People, supra note 20.
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In Christianson v. Cecil,2 4 the court found an implied dedica-
tion where the original owner made statements that he intended it
to be a public alley. The city cut the curb, cleaned the alley and
ribbed the sidewalk crossing, and the line of the alley was definite
and had been used for more than twenty years.
To prevent the municipality from being burdened indiscrimin-
ately with the preservation of streets whenever an individual should
see fit to dedicate a portion of his land for use as streets, the courts
require that the offer must have been accepted by the city before
the dedication is complete.2 5 This acceptance theoretically takes
place when it is in the public interest to possess and control the
street. During the time after the offer and prior to acceptance, the
city is not bound to any duties in connection with the land and ac-
quires no rights or interest therein. -6 The landowner is free to with-
draw his offer of dedication unless some public or private rights
have intervened.27 The owner can revoke the offer merely by con-
veying the same land to another.2 8 Conversely the city may lose its
right to accept by the doctrine of estoppel in pais.'t In John Mouat
Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 10 the case was remanded on the ques-
tion of the city having been estopped where it appeared the city
had never, in the twenty years since the offer of dedication, ac-
cepted, repaired or improved the streets dedicated, and at the same
time the area had been fenced and a house built.
Whenever a street or highway is abandoned or vacated it is no
longer public property. The public officials are not responsible for
its repair, and being private property, it must be rededicated ac-
cording to all the rules applying to dedications before it will again
become a street.-
C. Prescription
Another method that has arisen in Colorado cases by which
land becomes a public street is prescription or adverse user.32 Tradi-
tional elements are needed to establish prescription. In addition,
Colorado has a statute allowing a road to become a public highway
if used adversely for twenty years." Under this statute the elements
necessary are that the user "must have been adverse, that is, under
claim of right; the line of road must have been reasonably definite
and certain; there must have been an unqualified intention to set
apart a line for the road, and the use must have been more than
mere permissive use.1'3 4 Prescription cannot be established by an
"indefinite and indiscriminate use of a wide extent of country at
the whim or caprice of the traveler.""--, Continuous public use for
24 109 Colo. 510, 127 P.2d 325 (1942).
25 Hand v. Rhodes, 125 Colo. 508, 245 P.2d 292 (1952); Trine v. City of Pueblo, 21 Colo. 102,
39 Pac. 330 (1895); John Mouat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac. 237 (1895); City
of Denver v. Denver & S.F.Ry., 17 Colo. 583, 31 Pac. 338 (1892). If the city accepts, the acceptance
must be subject to any pre-existing rights of way. City of Denver v. Denver & S.F.Ry., 17 Colo.
583, 31 Pac. 338 (1892); City of Denver v. Mullen, 7 Colo. 345, 3 Pac. 693 (1884).
26 Hand v. Rhodes, 125 Colo. 508, 245 P.2d 292 (1952); Board of County Comm'rs v. Warneke, 85
Colo. 388, 276 Pac. 671 (1929).
27 11 McQuilfin, Municipal Corporations § 33.60 (3d ed. 1950).
"S Trine v. City of Pueblo, 21 Colo. 102, 39 Pac. 330 (1895).
29 John Mouat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac. 237 (1895).
3 ) Ibid.
'41 Hand v. Rhodes, 125 Colo. 508, 245 P.2d 292 (1952).
32 Hecker v. City & County of Denver, 80 Colo. 390, 252 Pac. 808 (1927); Mitchell v. City of
Denver, 33 Colo. 37, 78 Pac. 686 (1904).
33 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-1(3) (1953).
34 Lieber a. People, 33 Colo. 493, 499, 81 Pac. 270, 271 (1905). Accord, Olson v. People, 56
Colo. 199, 138 Pac. 21 (1914); Starr v. People, 17 Colo. 458, 30 Pac. 64 (1892).
35 Friel v. People, 4 Colo. App. 259, 260, 35 Pac. 676, 677 (1894).
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the full length of time must be present.' 6 Wire gates across a private
road so that travelers must open and close them will prevent that
road from becoming a public highway under this statute.3 7
Recently the court quoted this statute in justification of a deci-
sion s.3 8 The statute seems to add little to the case; the requirements
of the statute are the same as at common law.
Some land was levied upon for taxes and the county became
the tax sale certificate holder. With the county's permission, the
road in question was then constructed across a portion of this land
and was continuously used by the public from 1938 to 1960. In 1945
a treasurer's deed to some of the land was issued to some of the
plaintiffs and in 1956 one was issued to the remaining plaintiffs.
These plaintiffs, in 1960, claimed ownership of the street area and
the right to hold it free from the easement.
The court held: (1) the county's tax sale certificate was only
a lien and the county was thus not the true owner from which per-
mission could be obtained to negative the adverse nature of the use;
(2) the treasurer's deeds of 1945 and 1956 did not convey a title
free from adverse use; and (3) the use fulfilled the requirements
to establish a public highway under the statute.
The true owner had, in effect, lost his land and would lose noth-
ing more from adverse use across it. Even though the original
owner retained record title, the county was the party most inter-
ested in preserving the parcel of ground in order to realize payment
for delinquent taxes. Prescription will not ripen against the govern-
36 Goerke v. Town of Manitou, 25 Colo. App. 482, 139 Poc. 1049 (1914).
37 Martino v. Fleenor, 365 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1961).
38 Town of Silver Plume v. Hudson, 15 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 157 (1963).
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ment;3 9 neither should this adverse use operate toward a ripenec
easement where the county was the preserving party for at leas'
seven years.
Furthermore, Colorado has said that adverse possession will b(
interrupted by a treasurer's deed.4 0 The court distinguished thi,
case on the basis that here was an easement established by th(
public. The court did not elaborate. A tax deed traditionally passe,
title free from all other interests. Although a majority hold that ar
easement is not extinguished, other cases have held that easement,
established after the land is assessed are extinguished by the tal
deed because the government is entitled to drive proceeds on th(
land as it was assessed and not on land as it is later burdened witl
an easement.4 Here the land as levied upon was free from easemeni
or adverse use.
The fact that the street was constructed and plainly used sc
that any grantee in 1945 or 1956 should have had sufficient notice
of the easement, lends some support to the court, but it announced
no helpful principle of decision. The outcome is that the bare fac
situation of adverse use as a road by the public prior to issuance ol
a treasurer's deed will result in a decision favorable to the advers-
ing public.
The result cannot be criticized. The court refused to allow pri-
vate individuals, who could have known of the road, to take the
only main access from the east into the mountain town of Silver
Plume.
II. TITLE
A. Common Law Easement
At common law a presumption exists that only an easement is
created when a street is dedicated to the public unless there is some
statement to the contrary. The reasoning is that an easement is the
greatest privilege needed by the public to be able to pass freely over
the street. Colorado is in line with this common law rule when the
dedication is by common law rather than by statutory proceedings.
4 2
The 1906 case of City of Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co.43
was disposed of in a manner consistent with the rule of the creation
of an easement. A statutory dedication had failed but a common
law dedication resulted from the failure. This type of resulting com-
mon law dedication was not differently treated from any intended
common law dedication; that is, it resulted in conveying an ease-
ment only. A published opinion in 1901 upon the same Coronado
Mining case on an earlier appeal14 had included much dicta that the
fee passed. The reasoning in that case was that by the attempted
statutory dedication the dedicator must of necessity have intended a
fee to pass, therefore his intention would govern in the resulting
3., 17A Am. Jur. Easements §68 (1957)
441 Jocobs v. Perry, 135 Colo. 550, 313 P.2d 1008 (1957); Harrison v. Everett, 135 Colo. 55, 308
P.2d 216 (1957).
41 See 17A Am. Jur. Easements § 169 (1957).
42 Hecker v. City & County of Denver, 80 Colo. 390, 252 Poc. 808 (1927); City of Leadville v.
Coronodo Mining Co., 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906); City of Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 472(1877>.
43 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906).
44 29 Colo. 17, 67 Pac. 289 (1901).
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common law dedication. Upon the later appeal the court stated that
the dicta was pot controlling.
B. Statutory Fee
When statutory proceedings are proper, a "fee" vests in the city
by virtue of statute. An early statute provided:
Upon the filing of any such map or plat, the fee of all
streets, alleys, avenues, highways, parks, and other parcels
of ground reserved therein to the use of the public, shall
vest in such city or town, if incorporated, in trust, for the
uses therein named and expressed; or if such town be not
incorporated, then in the county, until such town shall be-
come incorporated, for the like uses.
45
1. Qualified Fee-In Trust. In Olin v. Denver & R. G. R. R.,4 6
the court declared that the city held title to the street solely for
street purposes and that the nature of the title was a qualified fee.
The fee would terminate when the land was no longer used for
street purposes.
The statute that now vests the fee in the city, found in the
article providing for incorporation, reads:
All avenues, streets, alleys, parks, and other places de-
signated or described as for public use on the map or plat
of any city or town, or of any addition made to such city
or town, shall be deemed to be public property, and the fee
thereof be vested in such city or town.
4
7
The first opinion in the same Coronado Mining case as dis-
cussed above made much of the absence of the words "in trust" in
the later statute quoted here. The writer of the opinion thought that
a successful statutory dedication passed a fee simple absolute to the
city unburdened by the trust. The thought was that under the new
statute the streets would no longer be held as a qualified fee, as a
fee simple on special limitation. With that interpretation, it was
easy to conclude that the mining under the street could be legal
only with permission from the city.
As mentioned earlier, that opinion lost most of its vitality when
the second appeal decision was announced and the court refused to
follow the opinion of the first appeal. Some credit must be given
for the realization of the impact in the changed wording, but as late
as 1942 the court had reiterated the presence of a trust for the peo-
ple.
48
2. Absolute Fee in Surface. The remarks as to the words "in
trust" undoubtedly had some influence upon City of Leadville v.
Bohn Mining Co.,49 another case decided in 1906. This case deserves
special discussion. It should be borne in mind that because of the
change in the statute that had been noticed, the contention was
strong that the vested fee must be a fee simple absolute.
The mining company was extracting minerals from under an
area of the city. The mining was at a depth of four hundred or five
45 This can be found in Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 163, § 156 (1935).
4625 Colo. 177, 53 Pac. 454 (1898). Further effect upon the title at time of vacation -ill be
considered intro.
47 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-1-7 (1953).
48 City of Colorado Springs v. Weiher, 110 Colo. 55, 129 P.2d 988 (1942).
49 37 Colo. 248, 86 Pac. 1038 (1906). The New Mexico Supreme Court has said that its identical
statute would have to be interpreted as in this Colorado case. Phillips Mercantile Co. v. City of
Albuquerque, 60 N.M. 1, 287 P.2d 77 (1955).
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hundred feet and would in no way interefere with the ordinary uses
of the city streets. The city, however, claiming it owned a fee simple
absolute in the streets, brought suit to restrain further mining and
recover damages for the ores already taken. The city had acquired
its rights from a good statutory dedication. Clearly the mining com-
pany could not be allowed to keep the minerals under the theory
that there had been merely a common law dedication which passes
only an easement. Here some sort of fee was definitely in the city
by virtue of the statute: "All avenues, streets . . .described as for
public use on the map or plat of any city or town .. . , shall be
deemed to be public property and the fee thereof be vested in such
city or town. ' ' 5t The court felt the question presented was: What
constitutes a street as contemplated in the statute?
The court used as it basis the traditional definition that the
street included the surface and so much land below the surface as
was necessary for ordinary municipal uses such as storm drains,
sewers, or gas pipes. It was this area and this area only the fee of
which was vested in the city. The city, therefore, could never re-
strain the use of the subsoil so long as it did not interfere with the
ordinary uses of the street. Either by common law easement or by
statutory fee the city is allowed to exercise dominion over the sur-
face and some fifteen feet below the surface.
In review, the city has an easement from a common law dedica-
tion. It has a fee from a statutory dedication. That fee is in so much
of the surface and ground as can legitimately be used for street
purposes. Some doubt exists whether the fee is a fee simple ab-
solute or whether it is a fee simple on a special limitation because it
is held in trust for street purposes and will terminate and revert to
the abutting owners if it should ever cease to be used as a street. A
statute governs the vesting when the street ceases to be used as a
street, so that this point of the discussion may be academic.51
III. USE
The public authorities are vested with a street for the sole pur-
pose of providing free, unobstructed, continuous passage over the
land. Incidental uses may be made if in the public interest and for
public purposes. Municipalities, for instance, can use the subsurface
of the street for sewer pipes, gas pipes and water mains because
these are municipal government uses for the general public, and
streets are especially suitable for such installation.
5 2
The authorities can authorize certain types of use of the street;
they can regulate the use and the users.Y- The city can grant the
privilege of special use and demand compensation therefor which
is deemed to be in the nature of rentals.
54
50 See note 47 supra.
- 1 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-12 (1953).
.,2 A county highway within city limits retains its character as county highway but is under
supervision and control of the town. Morrison v. Town of Lafayette, 67 Colo. 220, 184 Poc. 301
(1919).
5;x See Russell v. Aragon, 146 Colo. 332, 361 P.2d 346 (1961) (public authority may abate nui-
sance summarily if not capricious, unreasonable or negligent); Heckendorf v. Town of Littleton, 132
Colo. 108, 286 P.2d 615 (1955) (town can regulate curb cuts, but not so as to deny or unduly hamper
ingress, egress); City & County of Denver r. Trailkill, 125 Colo. 488, 244 P.2d 1074 (1952) (city
cannot prohibit reasonable business on streets; can regulate); Staley v. Vaughn, 92 Colo. 6, 17 P.2d
299 (1932) (Denver has power under charter to regulate vehicular traffic); Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo.
320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913) (no power in municipality to require consent of owners in same block
before one can erect a store building); Colorado & S. Ry. v. City of Fort Collins, 52 Colo. 281, 121
Pac. 747 :1911) (city can require railway to operate with due care for public travel).
.4 City & County of Denver v. Stenger, 295 Fed. 809 (8th Cir. 1924).
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Anyone may use the public streets in conducting his business
so long as it does not tend permanently to obstruct passage. This
right is subject to the power of the people to make restrictions upon
use. Such a restriction is found in a revocable license needed to op-
erate a bus line.55 Any franchise, a privilege not enjoyed by others
in common, and granted in perpetuity, must come from the sover-
eign, the state, or the city acting under a piece of sovereignty dele-
gated to it.
56
The Colorado Supreme Court has spoken of the power of a
municipality and the purpose of streets in these words:
The incorporating act ... created a trust for the holding of
the fee simple title of, and to, all streets and alleys of the
town, which thereby became vested in the town, in these
simple words, "which shall hold the same for the use of the
public." This means, that any attempted regulation of the
use of the streets or sidewalks, by the town or city, must be
for the benefit of the whole public, for travel, the intended
purpose of their dedication as such, and only such struc-
tures should be maintained in the street and sidewalk areas
as are necessary to meet public requirements and use.
Many reasons might be presented why a city might ob-
struct, or even close, a street or sidewalk temporarily in the
interest of public use or welfare, but it can never authorize
a permanent encroachment by private individuals, and the
latter can never successfully set up a claim of right to en-
cumber the public streets or walks. It then follows that the
city cannot grant the exclusive use of the streets or side-
walks, or any part thereof, to private persons for their use
or gain, for such would be in direct violation of its only
right to accept public streets at all.57
The Colorado Constitution provides:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for
public or private use, without just compensation. Such com-
pensation shall be ascertained by a board of commissioners.
of not less than three freeholders, or by a jury, when re-
quired by the owner of the property, in such manner as may
be prescribed by law, and until the same shall be paid to
the owner, or into the court for the owner, the property
shall not be needlessly disturbed, or the proprietary rights
of the owner therein divested."
A. Injunction Against Use
Abutting landowners who do not own the fee in the street, as
in the case of many city streets, do not have an interest that entitles
55 See City of Denver v. Girard, 21 Colo. 447, 42 Pac. 662 (1895).
56 People ex rel. Foley v. Stapleton, 98 Colo. 354, 56 P.2d 931 (1936); Denver & Swansea Ry. v.
Denver City Ry., 2 Colo. 673 (1875); Ward v. Colorado E. R.R., 22 Colo. App. 332, 125 Pac. 567
(1912). The Colorado Constitution has a restrictive provision: "No franchise relating to any street,
alley or public place of said city and county shall be granted except upon the vote of qualifying
taxpaying electors." Colo. Const. art. XX, § 4. See McPhee & McGinnity Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 158
Fed. 5 (8th Cir. 1907); Berman v. City & County of Denver, 120 Colo. 218, 209 P.2d 754 1949). A
city which grants a franchise when it has no authority will later be estopped to deny its power
when it has specifically recognized the grant after the power has been delegated to it. City of
Denver v. Mercantile Trust Co., 201 Fed. 790 (8th Cir. 1912).
57 Wood v. People ex rel. Stonebraker, 96 Colo. 431, 433, 43 P.2d 1001, 1002 (1935).
58 Colo. Const. art. II, § 15.
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them to successfully enjoin the use or vacation of a street,59 al-
though they may later have an action for recovery of compensation
in the form of damages. Another view noticed in a recent case is
that a court of equity cannot interfere with the vacation of a street
by public officials except for fraud or plain abuse of power.'0
Probably an injunction could not be obtained even where the
abutting owner held the fee because the constitution speaks of be-
ing "needlessly disturbed." The court would probably hesitate to
find needless disturbance in a city council's decision unless a plain
abuse of power appeared. In contrast, where the use of the streets
is under no valid authority, the obstruction or use then constitutes
a public nuisance and can be enjoined by an individual who suffers
special injury from it.
61
The general public seems to be able to bring suit to cause the
removal of any obstruction of the free passage on streets and side-
walks. The citizen and taxpayer can compel the city to observe its
duty to remove them.
6 '
B. Compensation for Damages
1. Rights of Abutting Owner. Without the aid of the constitu-
tion, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Colorado Central R. R. v. Mol-
landin,63 would not allow recovery for injuries to property from the
use of the street because the fee was in the city and the city has
complete control over the use of the street. Mollandin, the plaintiff,
was more successful in the federal court 64 where he urged the state
constitution as a basis of recovery. That court said the Colorado
Central case was not controlling, and that the use of the street was
a right of property in the plaintiff that, if not taken, was definitely
damaged under the provision in the constitution. The same distinc-
tion can be made in later Colorado cases where the constitution was
always used.
The abutting landowner, even when the fee is in the city, is
said to have a peculiar interest in the street. He holds an easement
59 City of Colorado Springs v. Crumb, 364 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1961); Albi Mercantile Co. v. City
& County of Denver, 54 Colo. 474, 131 Poc. 275 (1913); Haskell v. Denver Tramway Co., 23 Colo.
60, 46 Pac. 121 (1896); Denver, U. & P. Ry. v. Toohey, 15 Colo. 297, 25 Pac. 166 (1890); Denver,
U. & P. Ry. v. Barsaloux, 15 Colo. 290, 25 Pac. 165 (1890); Denver & S. F. Ry. v. Domke, 11 Colo.
247, 17 Pac. 777 (1888).
60 City of Colorado Springs v. Crumb, 364 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1961).
61 Word v. Colorado E. R.R., 22 Colo. App. 332, 125 Pac. 567 (1912); Denver & Swansea Ry. v.
Denver City Ry., 2 Colo. 673 (1875).
62 People ex rel. Stonebraker v. Wood, 90 Colo. 506, 10 P.2d 331 (1932). Colo. Rev. Stat.
139-76-2 (1953) imposes the duty to keep the streets open and in repair.
63 4 Colo. 154 (1878).
64 Mollandin v. Union Pac. Ry., 14 Fed. 394 (C.C.D.Colo. 1882).
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which is an incorporal hereditament and is property. For wrongful
interference with it, the Colorado court allows compensation.6 The
general rule can be stated: Where the adjacent owner is denied free
use of the street for ingress and egress and the value of his premises
is diminished, it is a damage for which there should be compensa-
tion under the constitution.6 6 But it is damum absque injuria where
it is occasioned by a reasonable improvement of the street by proper
authorities for the greater convenience of the public.6 7 Recovery is
denied for these reasonable improvements, these reasonably antici-
pated uses, upon the justification that the adjacent owner contem-
plated, at the time he dedicated or at the time he purchased, that
the city would alter the use.
2. Uses-Anticipated-Unanticipated. It now becomes impor-
tant to determine what are "anticipated uses" and what are "unan-
ticipated uses." In dictum in two early Colorado cases6 s the court
said uses reasonably to be anticipated included the raising or lower-
ing of the grade of the street, the laying of pavements and construc-
tion of culverts, the building and operation of a street railroad, con-
struction of sewers and the laying of gas and water pipes. For these
changes no damages will be awarded.
Unanticipated uses have included an ordinary railroad as dis-
tinguished from a local street railway, 9 a water supply ditch,70 a
viaduct,' an underpass, 72 and a material change of street grade.
73
As to the use of the street for an ordinary railroad, the city may
have the power to control railroads passing into the city and even
the power to license the use of the streets to an ordinary railroad.
This power, however, does not serve as notice to the landowner,
who dedicates or buys lots next to a street, that a likely use of the
street will include an ordinary railroad. Further, the ordinance
granting a license to the railroad will not immunize the railroad
from liability for actual injuries sustained by abutting landowners
even though the ordinance is within the city's power.7 4
Despite the remark in the early case that changes in the street
grade could be anticipated and therefore were not compensable,
certain refinements of policy have been enunciated in later cases.
;5 It is easier to award compensation under the Colorado Constitution which provides compen-
sation where property is "taken or damaged" than under others that compensate only for property
"token." Comment, 16 Ore. L. Rev. 155 (1937).
66 Roth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960); Minnequa Lumber Co. v. City & County
of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1919); Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 115,
186 Pac. 904 (1919); Russo v. City of Pueblo, 63 Colo. 519, 168 Pac. 649 (1917); City of Colorado
Springs v. Stark, 57 Colo. 384, 140 Pac. 794 (1914); Denver & S.F. Ry. v. Hannegan, 43 Colo. 122,
95 Poc. 343 (1908); City of Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 Pac. 789 (1894); Town of Longmont v.
Parker, 14 Colo. 386, 23 Pac. 443 (1890); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac.
714 (1887); City of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883).
67 Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 54 Colo. 593, 131 Pac. 409 (1913); City of Pueblo v.
tSroit0 20 Colo. 13, 36 Pac. 789 (1894); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714
(1887); City of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883).
68 Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714 (1887); City of Denver v. Bayer,
7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883). See also Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 54 Colo. 593, 131
Pac. 409 (1913).
69 Mollandin v. Union Pac. Ry., 14 Fed. 394 (C.C.D.Colo. 1882); Denver & R.G. Ry. v. Bourne,
11 Colo. 59, 16 Pac. 839 (1887); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714 (1887);
City of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883). Mere increase in railroad traffic is within
the original servitude and is not further grounds for compensation. Denver & S.F. Ry. v. Hannegan,
43 Colo. 122, 95 Pac. 343 (1908).
70 Town of Longmont v. Parker, 14 Colo. 386, 23 Pac. 443 (1890).
71 Minnequa Lumber Co. v. City & County of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1919); City
of Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 Pac. 789 (1894).
72 City of Colorado Springs v. Stark, 57 Colo. 384, 140 Pac. 794 (1914).
73 City of Denver v. Bonesteel, 30 Colo. 107, 69 Pac 595 (1902).
74 Denver & S.F. Ry. v. Hannegan, 43 Colo. 122, 95 Pac. 343 (1908); Denver & S.R. Ry. v.
Domke, 11 Colo. 247, 17 Pac. 777 (1888); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac.
714 (1887).
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In City of Denver v. Bonestee ,7 5 the court refused to be influenced
by that early dictum where the city materially changed the grade,
of the street and the lot owner had made improvements in reliance:
upon an established grade. 76 In Bonesteel the court summarized
the holdings of other jurisdictions:
Some of them hold that a city is liable in damages to the
abutting owner of land on a street the grade of which has
been reduced from the natural surface, whether it be the
one first established or for a change of a previously estab-
lished grade. Others seem to restrict liability to cases where
there has been a change of a previous grade, and to exempt
from the operation of the constitutional provision the first
reduction of grade from the natural surface.'
The rule that the lot owner must anticipate reasonable changes
which are for the good of the public possibly is not affected greatly
by the decision to allow recovery for a material change of street
grade. The first establishment of grade is certainly to be anticipated.
Subsequent changes would be rare and could be justifiably classed
as unanticipated.
Only four years after the Bonesteel case the court further solid-
ified the law as to street grade changes in the case of Leiper v. City
& County of Denver7s where the facts presented were that of an
original change of grade from the natural surface. The court ap-
proved of Bonesteel, but was constrained by the same early dictum,
and held that the first change of grade made in accordance with
the first establishment of grade, in other words the change from the
natural surface, was reasonably to be anticipated and no recovery
could be had. The court concluded:
As well said by Judge Dillon, while sensible of the ap-
parent difficulty of defining the grounds for the distinction,
we regard it as almost, if not quite, stare decisis in this jur-
isdiction, that, for the raising or lowering of the grade of a
street by a municipality from the natural surface to the
grade established in the first instance, the municipality is
not liable to the abutting lot owner for consequential dam-
ages to his property, unless the change of grade is unrea-
sonable, or has been negligently made.7 '
3. Extent of Access. The taking or damaging of access is a com-
pensable injury as noted above. The injury is compensable even
though the access is not wholly taken. For instance, a man should
be compensated for loss of business where the street upon which he
is located is no longer a commonly traveled way as a result of some
obstruction set up by the city.O
The easement of an abutting landowner that may be taken or
75 See note 73 supra.
76 When plaintiff landowner relies upon the appearance of the grade and fails to inquire as to
the established grade of the street, that failure moy prevent recovery. See City of Denver v.
Vernia, 8 Colo. 399, 8 Pac. 656 (1885); Aicher v. City of Denver, 10 Colo.App. 413, 52 Poc. 86 (1897).
77 See note 73 supro at 111, 69 Poc. at 596.
7S 36 Colo. 110, 85 Pac. 849 (1906).
791Id. at 118, 85 Pac. at 851.
SO Minneaua Lumber Co. v. City & (ounty of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1919). See
toth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960); Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo.
115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919); City of Denver v. Bonesteel, 30 Colo. 107, 69 Pac. 595 (1902); City of
Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 Pac. 789 (1894).
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damaged by changed use or vacation extends to the full width of
the street and not just to the center of the street."'
4. Factors Affecting Recovery-Damages. The abutting land-
owner who has been injured by an unanticipated use of the street
is undoubtedly entitled to recover. Some care must be taken, how-
ever, to choose the proper party defendant. The plaintiff can recover
against the municipality only when the new, unantipicated use is
initiated for the direct safety and benefit of the public. For damage
from a use which brings about a private benefit, such as allowing
the railroad to use a street, the recovery may be had against only
that private user on the theory that the one gaining a benefit should
compensate for injury to others.8
An abutting landowner may be held to have impliedly assented
to a use that has continued without objection from him for a long
period of time
s. 8 3
A release by the landowner of claims for damage from con-
struction of a railroad or any other use will prevent the person re-
leasing from later objecting to an alteration of the rails or an
alteration of whatever use it is; the use has not changed.
4
Colorado follows orthodox law in holding that a person who
suffers only in kind like the rest of the citizenry from a change of
use of the street cannot recover for the injury. The injury must be
particular, different in kind, special, and affecting property or an
appurtenance.85
The term "abutting landowner" is, in this area of the law, used
to define a general class of persons. But it is not used so strictly as
to deny recovery in a proper case to one whose property does not
abut the portion of the street that has been applied to a different
use. The court, in Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt,8 6 said:
The cases in this and in other jurisdictions, which
denied a recovery to one whose property was located on an-
other street, or on a different part of the street vacated or
obstructed, were generally cases where such plaintiff or
complainant was not deprived of the only reasonable means
of access to his property. 13 R.C.L. 74, sec. 65. There are au-
thorities holding that one whose property does not abut
upon the street or part of the street which is vacated is
entitled to compensation where all access to his property to
the system of streets in one direction is cut off. 28 Cyc. 1083
,1 Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919).
82 Roth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960) (no discussion as to why private land-
owners abutting the vacated street were proper defendants, but presumed they benfited most);
Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919) (railroad claimed that
damage actually resulted from the vacation, but court said the vacation was solely to allow
development of railroad); City of Colorado Springs v. Stark, 57 Colo. 384, 140 Pac. 794 (1914)
(recovery against city because underpass was primarily for benefit of city traffic even though
railroad built it); Denver & R.G. Ry. v. Bourne, 11 Colo. 59, 16 Pac. 839 (1887) (recovery from
railroad); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714 (1887) (recovery from railroad);
Sorensen v. Town of Greeley, 10 Colo. 369, 15 Pac. 803 (1887) (no recovery against city where
railroad destroyed flume carrying water to plaintiff's crops; Town of Idaho Springs v. Filteau,
10 Colo. 105, 14 Pac. 48 (1887) and Town of Idaho Springs v. Woodward, 10 Colo. 104, 14 Pac.
49 (1887) (no recoveries from city where flume carrying water to mining company leaked); City
of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883) (no recovery from city for railroad in street).
83 Denver, U. & P. Ry. v. Barsaloux, 15 Colo. 290, 25 Pac. 165 (1890); Denver & S.F. Ry. v.
Domke, 11 Colo. 247, 17 Pac. 777 (1888).
84 Denver, U. & P. Ry. v. Toohey, 15 Colo. 297, 25 Pac. 166 (1890).
85 City of Colorado Springs v. Weiher, 110 Colo. 55, 129 P.2d 988 (1942); Minnequa Lumber Co.
v. City & County of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1919); Gilbert v. Greeley, S.L. & P. Ry.,
13 Colo. 501, 22 Pac. 814 (1889).
8667 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919).
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. . . The correct rule, applicable in the instant case, is
that the owner of property which does not abut on the part
of the street closed is entitled to compensation, provided he
is able to prove special and peculiar damage.
8 7
This case found that the plaintiff's easement had been sub-
stantially impaired. It found that the plaintiff, as a result of the
construction of an approach to a viaduct and the closing of certain
other streets, had no access to the business district, even by going
a reasonable distance out of the way, due to lack of through streets
and presence of railroad tracks. The case thus came within the rule
to which reference has been made that one whose property does
not abut upon the street vacated is still entitled to compensation if
all access to the system of streets in one direction is cut off.
The case is in this way distinguishable from Whitsett v. Union
Depot & R.R. 8 where the plaintiff complained that the Union Depot
was placed in his direct path to the business district, but nothing
showed that he was cut off from the whole system of streets in that
direction.
The measure of compensation for interference of ingress and
egress is the actual diminution in the market value of the abutting
land, for any use to which it could reasonably be put, which has
resulted directly from the changed use or vacation of the s'reet.s
5. Other Theories of Recovery. Even though a constitutionally
compensable injury cannot be established, the city may be held
liable under tort law for negligently making the change.90
Another theory used to recover damages for wrongful use of
streets is that of public nuisance. 91 This theory also requires show-
ing a special or peculiar injury beyond that suffered in common
with the public. Nuisance might be of value where the plaintiff is
otherwise estopped to question the use, but a public nuisance could
be established in the "altered" use. The theory of nuisance may also
be valuable when the statute of limitation period has run since the
change of use occurred, but a continuing nuisance can be estab-
lished, against which the statute begins to run anew each day.Y
And, as mentioned earlier, the theory of public nuisance can be the
basis of a suit for injunction against the wrongful use.
IV. VACATION
The municipal authorities have the power to vacate streets
when the action would be in the best interests of the public. These
vacations may take place in order that a changed use can be carried
out, or they may take place as an independent act solely because
the public no longer needs the street for passage. In either event
the act must not be arbitrary.' 4 Private benefit may accrue from
the vacation but not at the expense of the public interests.
S7 Id. at 118-19, 186 Pac. at 906.
SS 10 Colo. 243, 15 Pac. 339 (1887).
89 City of Denver v. Bonesteel, 30 Colo. 107, 69 Pac. 595 (1902); Town of Longmont v. Parker,
14 Colo. 386, 23 Pac. 443 (1890).
90 City of Denver v. Vernia, 8 Colo. 399, 8 Pac. 656 (1885).
91 Jackson v. Kiel, 13 Colo. 378, 22 Poc. 504 (1889).
92 Union Pac. Ry. v. Foley, 19 Colo. 280, 35 Pac. 542 (1893).
93 A deed of vacation is competent evidence when a public highway is alleged. Gromer a.
Papke, 71 Colo. 440, 207 Pac. 862 (1922).
94 City of Goldfield v. Golden Cycle Gold Mining Co., 60 Colo. 220, 152 Pac. 896 (1915).
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The Colorado Constitution provides:
Section 25. Special legislation prohibited.-The general
assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the
following enumerated cases, that is to say; for granting
divorces; laying out, opening, altering or working roads or
highways; vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys, and
public grounds .... 95
This specifically prohibits the legislature from vacating streets, but
it does not prohibit delegation. By this restriction it is implied that
the legislature has the power to authorize the municipality to act in
such cases.96
A. By Private Persons
Colorado once had a statute that provided that streets could be
vacated by private action with the consent of all the landowners in
a town site or subdivision of not less than four blocks adjacent to
each other.97 No statute of the legislature can confer upon public or
private individuals the power to vacate a street in an arbitrary man-
ner. Any deed of abutting owners which purported to vacate the
street under the authority of the statute, but which was done ar-
bitrarily was a nullity s8 The same principle would govern a vaca-
tion by public authorities.
While the emphasis of this study is upon city streets, in many
cases streets and roads and highways are treated the same" 9 Under
this statute which allowed private action of vacation, however,
there was a distinction. This statute did not include within its de-
scription a "road" in any outlying area that had not been subdivided
into blocks because streets and alleys exist only where the land is
in blocks.'00
B. Compensation for Damage
So that it is not overlooked, the vacation of a street will often
operate to deny abutting landowners of part of their access. To the
extent that there is special injury, there can be recovery the same
as when the use is changed.101
95 Colo. Const. art. V, § 25.
96 City of Goldfield v. Golden Cycle Mining Co., 60 Colo. 220, 152 Pac. 896 (1915); Whitsett
e. Union Depot & R.R., 10 Cola. 243, 15 Pac. 339 (1887),
97 This repealed statute can be found in Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 163, § 117 (1935).
98 City of Goldfield v. Golden Cycle Minina Co., supra note 96.
99 Armstrong v. Johnson Storage & Moving Co., 84 Colo. 142, 268 Pac. 978 (1928).
100 Balanced Rock Scenic Attractions, Inc. v. Town of Manitou, 38 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1930).
101 Roth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960); Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt,
67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919).
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C. Nature and Effects of Reversion
1. Early Confusion. An early case in Colorado, Denver & S.F.
Ry. v. Domke, '0 2 contained surprising language, inconsistent with
the common law, which caused some confusion as to the nature of
the title and its effect upon vacation of the street. The court, in dis-
cussing the right of abutting landowners to enjoin the change from
a street railway to an ordinary railway, said:
As we have already seen, the fee to Willow Lane and Clark
Street is by law vested in the city in trust for the use of the
public. It is not, and never was, in the present plaintiffs,
who are purchasers of lots subsequent to the dedication of
the streets. There is no evidence to show that the grants to
them included the reversionary interest or reserved rights,
if any such interest or rights there be, of the dedicator in
this fee. If the street should be abandoned by the municipa-
lity, or for any other reason the trust should fail, and the
fee pass out of the city, it would not revert to plaintiffs.
Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 301. It follows, therefore, that
the increased burden mentioned would not constitute an
actual taking of plaintiffs' property, though their peculiar
interest in the street as abutting owners might entitle them
to compensation for injuries inflicted.1 1"
The court continues immediately with what would seem to be
more nearly orthodox reasoning and not quite so extreme:
Besides, it is suggested that, where such a qualified fee in
the city as we are now considering exists, "the reversionary
right of the owner of the fee in the surface of the street is
too remote and contingent to be of any appreciable value,
or to be regarded as property, which, under the constitu-
tion, is required to be paid for when its use is appropriated
by the public." Spencer v. Railroad Co. 23 W. Va. 406, and
cases cited.11
4
Later the court, in Olin v. Denver & R.G. R.R., 10' took the op-
portunity to rid itself of the strong language to the effect that upon
vacation the land would not revert to the abutting lot owners. In
that case the court said that this language had been mere dicta. It
proceeded to note also that the Domke case was probably the rea-
son why the legislature had amended the statute in 1889 in which it
provided that upon vacation, the fee vested in the abutting lot
owners to the center of the street.1
0 6
2. Conveyance of Abutting Lots Before Vacation. To form a
basis for discussion of the effect of a vacation upon the state of the
title, the effect of conveyances of abutting land should be examined.
Having reasoned that the grantee of land is entitled to all the
appurtment advantages, the rule has been followed that the grantee
takes title to the center of the street abutting, to the extent that the
102 11 Colo. 247, 17 Pac. 777 (1888).
103 Id. at 254, 17 Poc. at 780.
104 Id. at 254-55, 17 Pac. at 780.
105 25 Colo. 177, 53 Poc. 454 (1898).
106 Colo. Sess. Lows 1889, § 1 at 461-62.
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grantor has any interest in it, unless the grant expressly excludes
the street.107
An exception to this rule, or a further elaboration of it, is that
where the abutter-grantor has only an easement in the street and
the fee is vested in the public, then the interest to the center of the
street is not conveyed appurtment. The conveyance goes only to the
edge of the street.108 Thus, the rule is of importance only where the
fee to the street is held to be in the dedicator, and has not passed
to the city, that is, where the street originated by a common law
dedication.
Another situation that bears upon the application of the rule is
that once a conveyance has separated the street from the lots either
by describing them separately or by excluding one, then subsequent
grantors can never be held to have included the street in the con-
veyance describing the lots only.1'0
An interesting interpretation of a deed, and the application of
these rules occurred in Skerritt Inv. Co. v. City of Englewood.""0 A
phrase in the deed read:
[T] hat in the event said street north of the lots hereby con-
veyed (lots 48 and 49) and now known as Sheridan Ave-
nue, should for any reason be vacated, or cease to be used as
a public street, then the party of the second part shall have
the refusal of purchasing a strip fifty feet in width on the
north of the property hereby conveyed at the then market
value thereof, which value shall be fixed by any court of
competent jurisdiction."'
The phrase was held to be repugnant to the previous express un-
restricted grant and therefore not operative to, in any way, over-
come the presumption of conveying title to the center of the street.
3. Vesting Upon Vacation. Colorado cases have held the fee to
the street to vest in the abutting landowner under the common law
or by virtue of the Colorado statutes which have generally been a
reenactment of the common law with slight variations in specific
situations.
112
4. Conveyance After Vacation. A recent case divided the Colo-
rado court on the question of conveyances after vacation of a street.
Morrissey v. Achziger"1 3 deserves special treatment. The area
through which the street in question had run was platted and the
streets therein were dedicated in 1887. In 1937, the street was
vacated in front of lots 7 through 10, owned at that time by Stella
Kate Cullen. Cullen died leaving the lots to one Sarah Burns who
conveyed "Lots Six (6), Seven (7), Eight (8), Nine (9) and Ten
(10), Block Sixteen ...... to the defendant Morrissey, who, in turn,
conveyed to the plaintiff by a like description.
The plaintiffs brought a quiet title action over the area formerly
in the street. The defendant, Morrissey, claimed that the area of the
107 Skerritt Inv. Co. v. City of Englewood, 79 Colo. 645, 248 Pac. 6 (1926); McDonald v. Kummer,
56 Colo. 153, 137 Pac. 51 (1913) (dictum); Overland Mach. Co. v. Alpenfels, 30 Colo. 163, 69 Pac.
574 (1902) (dictum); Olin v. Denver & R.G. R.R., 25 Colo. 177, 53 Pac. 454 (1898).
108McDonald v. Kummer, 56 Colo. 153, 137 Pac. 51 (1913) (dictum).
109 Overland Mach. Co. v. Alpenfels, 30 Colo. 163, 69 Pac. 574 (1902).
11079 Colo. 645, 248 Pac. 6 (1926).
111 Id. at 652, 248 Pac. at 9.
112 Morrissey v. Achziger, 364 P.2d 187 (Cola. 1961); Skerritt Inv. Co. v. City of Englewood, 79
Colo. 645, 248 Pac. 6 (1926); Overland Mach. Co. v. Alpenfels, 30 Colo. 163, 69 Pac. 574 (1902).
The present statute is Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-12 (1953).
113 364 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1961).
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street was not intended to be passed to the plaintiffs. He also
claimed that he should have reformation of the deed from Burns to
reflect the true intent between Burns and himself that the street
area was to pass.
Briefly the court said that the original abutting owner, Cullen,
had been vested with the fee upon vacation of the street. This was
in no way determinative of the case, however. The court held that
the strip of land formerly in the street must be included in the de-
scription to be conveyed with the lot. The court said:
Certainly a person owning contiguous tracts of land can
convey one without conveying the other. A deed which ac-
curately and correctly describes a tract of land is not sub-
ject to construction or interpretation. If the description does
not express the intention of the parties, reformation is the
proper remedy. To hold otherwise would create chaos and
add a new and frightening chapter to the law of conveyanc-
ing.
11 4
Mr. Justice Doyle, two other justices joining, said:
I respectfully dissent! . .. [W]e are warned that "To
hold otherwise would create chaos and add a new and
frightening chapter to the law of conveyancing." I submit
that a rule which has a settling rather than an unsettling
effect on titles is not apt to create chaos. A rule which pre-
vents properties from being disjointed and which is de-
signed to obviate the existence of unusable rectangles of
property which could only serve to haunt adjacent owners
is not going to create chaos.'
1 5
Such was the theme of a convincing dissenting opinion. Mr.
Justice Doyle thought it was important to determine the ownership
of the street area. Because the street was located outside the city
limits, and because no Colorado statute vests title in the county the
common law must therefore govern.
Where the common law governs, the public acquires merely
an easement; the fee remains in the landowner. If the fee remains
in the landowner, he reasoned, then upon vacation of the street the
land is freed from the public easement but none of its area is sub-
ject to any change in ownership.
Mr. Justice Doyle inquires: "what change is effected by vaca-
tion which requires that it be mentioned in a conveyance?"
'"16
The law contains authority for the majority view of the court
that the area formerly in the street must be described to be con-
veyed. 1 7 To support this theory it is said that after vacation the
reason for the rule no longer exists; the owner is vested with title
and with possession and control and thus can choose to convey it in
whole or in separate tracts as he can with any land owned absolute-
lv. "Land is never appurtenant to land," the several cases say, and
one tract of land is never passed as an incident or accretion by
conveyance of an adjoining tract."8
114 Id. at 189.
11. Id. at 189-91.
1161 Id. at 191.
117 Both 2 Elliott, Roads and Streets § 1192 (3d ed. 1911) and Annot., 2 A.L.R. 6, 33 (1919)
quote from White v. Jefferson, 110 Minn. 276, 124 N.W. 373 (1910).
11 See the Washington cases discussed in Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 982, 1003 (1956).
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Title Standard Number 4 calls for any conveyance made after
vacation to include a specific description of that area of the prior
street if it is to be successfully conveyed." 9 Morrissey relied heavily
on this title standard 1 20 and Doyle's dissent charged influence by it.
The advisability of adherence to these standards is not here to be
discussed except to say that they do not and should not have force
of law.
The dissenting viewpoint is also supported in law and is the
prevalent viewpoint of the recent cases.'1
The question cannot escape being one of construction. The ma-
jority silently treated the land as being two tracts of land, the lot
was a different tract from the street. The conveyance, under this
view, became unambiguous. "Lot Seven" meant to the edge of the
street.
The dissent treats the land as always having been one tract.
Upon this basis the applicable rule is that all the grantor's interest
is conveyed that is not reserved.
Niceties of title have been troublesome in these Colorado cases.
The court, in this Morrissey case, has ignored the nature of the title
in the street. The case fails to give importance to the state of the
title in an effort to conform to local title examination practices. The
case is objectionable in that the majority has ignored what has
helped to standardize and give predictability to property law, that
is, the concept of various types of ownership.
A slightly different problem for the court has been the enact-
ment of statutes giving a "fee" to the city. The court has always
tended toward the common law easement, with the result that the
city has gained nothing by this statutory fee. For example, where
a statutory dedication fails the resulting common law dedication
will create an easement even though the original intent was to pass
a fee. The court has also required strict compliance with the statute
to complete a statutory dedication thereby limiting the number of
times the city receives a fee.
Most notable of the court's tendency was the Bohn Mining case
where the use of the subsoil for mining raised a question concern-
ing the nature of the fee vested in the city. The "fee" suddenly
became conspiciously similar to the common law easement.
Colorado has produced some interesting ramifications of this
area of the law and in the process has nullified the statutory pro-
visions as to ownership.
119 Colo. Bar Ass'n, Real Estate Standards No. 4.
120 Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Morrissey . Achziger, 364 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1961).
121 Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 982, 1002 (1956).
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By RONALD L. NIETO*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty-five years the federal courts have developed
a doctrine by which, in appropriate cases, they may decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction even though their jurisdiction has been properly
invoked. This doctrine has been aptly termed the "abstention doc-
trine." The occasions that call for the application of abstention are
those where the federal court is called upon to decide an issue of
state law under circumstances which require it to defer its decision
in favor of an adjudication by courts of the state concerned. The
circumstances that would require such action by the federal courts
are exceptional ones, and where abstention is employed it must
serve some countervailing interest that overrides the duty of a
federal court to decide a case properly before it. The purpose of
this paper will be to examine the abstention doctrine and the cir-
cumstances that require its use.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Federal Jurisdiction Could Not Be Declined
The idea that federal courts were under an imperative duty to
exercise their jurisdiction in every case that properly came before
them was one which the courts adhered to for many years. It prob-
ably sprang from dictum uttered by Chief Justice Marshall in an
early case: 1
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction
if it should not; but it is equally true, that it must take
jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legisla-
ture may, avoid a measure because it approaches the con-
fines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is
doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties,
a case may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought
before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly
avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do, is to exer-
cise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty.2
While this dictum may not have been followed uniformly,* it
had sufficient vitality to preclude serious challenge to the scope
of the federal courts' jurisdiction for a century. Not only did the
courts consider it an absolute duty to exercise their jurisdiction,
they gave short shrift to contentions that they should postpone
such exercise until a court of another jurisdiction could decide the
same issues.4 McClellan v. Carland 5 well illustrates this point. The
Senior student, University of Denver College of Law.
I Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 Texas L. Rev. 815 (1959).
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 257, 291 (1821).
3 See note 1 supro.
4 Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893); Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170 (1857).
5 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
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circuit court ordered a stay of the federal proceedings while the
state of South Dakota instituted an action in the state court to deter-
mine an escheat to it of the estate in controversy. If the state would
begin the action within a time limit set by the court, the court an-
nounced that it would extend the stay until determination of the
state court action. A decision by the state court would have been
res judicata in the federal proceedings. The Supreme Court re-
versed, saying that the circuit court had virtually abandoned its
jurisdiction and turned the matter over to the state court. "This,
it has been steadily held, a Federal court may not do."6
B. Awareness of Conflict between Sovereignties
Perhaps this idea persisted for so long because, until the early
part of the twentieth century, conflict between the federal and state
jurisdictions was not so apparent as it later became. The federal
courts, under the ruling of Swift v. Tyson,7 were considered to be
the state courts' equals as authoritative interpreters of the state law.
This sometimes resulted in two distinct lines of authority on the
same point of state law,8 and could not have been very pleasing to
state authorities. In such a situation, it is easy to visualize a state
policy being thwarted on occasion by a party resorting to a federal
court which had a different rule of law from the state court's. This
was not a direct interference with state authority and did not create
the friction that could result from direct interference.
Then the Supreme Court handed down the case of Ex parte
Young.9 This established that the eleventh amendment 10 did not bar
injunctions by a federal court against state officers acting in viola-
tion of the Constitution. Accordingly, a federal judge could restrain
state activities as unconstitutional, and incident to this, he could
issue an ex parte interlocutory stay pending determination of the
constitutional question.1 Subsequently, it was held that acts of
state officials, though contrary to but under color of state law, did
constitute state action under the fourteenth amendment.1- These
decisions greatly increased the sensitive area of federal-state con-
flict.
Congress was not long in reacting to these decisions. In 1910,
it put into effect the statute requiring a three judge federal court
to hear petitions for injunctions restraining the action of a state
official.' 3 This same statute provided for direct appeal from such
three judge courts to the Supreme Court. Thus, by this and other
enactments, 14 it can be seen that Congress did not approve of too
6 Id. at 281.
7 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842),
8 Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960).
9 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
10 U.S. Const. amend. Xl.
11 See Note, The Pullman Case: A Limitation on the Business of the Federal Courts, 54 Har. L.
Rev. 1379, 1381 (1941).
12 Home Tel, & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
13 Act of June 18, 1910 § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (1910), as amended 28 U.S.C. 88 2281, 2284 '1958).
Other legislative limitations on federal court jurisdiction are prohibitions against: injunctions to stay
state court proceedings except where authorized by act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958); enjoining assessment,
levy or collection of a state tax under state low where plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be
had in the courts of such state, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958); enjoining operation of or compliance with
an order affecting a public utility's rates made by a state administrative or rate-making body of
a state where jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance to the Constitu-
tion, and the order does not interfere with interstate commerce, and after reasonable notice ard
hearing, and a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
14 See note 13 supra.
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great an intereference by federal courts in the affairs of the states.
But the congressional scheme was far from comprehensive. It did
not, and perhaps could not, cover every area of potential conflict.
The federal courts were not unaware of this problem. "Caution
and reluctance" attended the consideration of cases involving local
controversies where there was threat of opposition between state
and federal courts.15 This was especially true where the relief asked
would be in the form of an injunction interfering with the activities
of state officials. 6 It was recognized that there were some issues
which should be adjudicated in the state courts, even though the
federal courts had jurisdiction of the cause. 17 However, the Supreme
Court still re'ained and exercised its power to construe state con-
stitutions and statutes even when it expressly stated its reluctance
to do so,' 8 although it also recognized that the ultimate determina-
tion of the application, construction and interpretation of a state
constitution"1 or s'atute 2 rested with the highest state court. The
Supreme Court expressed its guide to be "the scrupulous regard for
the rightful independence of state governments which should at all
times actuate the federal courts ....
C. The Erie Case
In Erie v. Tompkins,2 2 the Supreme Court finally repudiated
the Swift v. Tyson2 2 doctrine. Thereafter, the substantive law of the
state would be controlling on state issues when decided in federal
courts where jurisdiction is obtained by virtue of diversity of citi-
zenship. Consequently, the federal courts were bound by the deter-
minations of the state courts on state law issues. But it must be
noted that this is all that the Erie case held. Federal courts still had
the power to adjudicate issues of state law; however, they could no
longer formulate their own rules of decision independently of state
court rulings. The problem presented by Erie was the dilemma of
the federal courts when the state law was not clear, either because
there was no authoritative decision by the state court or because
there was a conflict in state authorities..2 4 In such a situation the
federal court was embarrassed by the necessity of deciding the state
law question by a ruling that would be the law of the case only and
that might be proved wrong by a subsequent state court decision.2 5
The problem can be put into focus by considering the alternatives
faced by a federal court in a case where it had jurisdiction by virtue
of diversity and where there are present state law issues and federal
constitutional questions. Assuming a case where the state law au-
thorities on the point at issue are unclear, the federal court is then
faced on the one hand with the well known reluctance to decide a
case on constitutional grounds where other grounds for decision
are available, and on the other hand with a reluctance to decide the
I., Hawks v. Hamil, 288 U.S. 52, 60 (1933).
10 Ibid.
17 See Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929); Cavanaugh v. Looney,
248 U.S. 453 (1919).
1 , Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 287 U.S. 346 (1932).
l9 Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177 (1933).
"_4 Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934).
21 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932).
'2304 U.S. 64 (1938).
:2: See note 7 supra.
"4 Kurland, supra note 8.
".-, Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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case by a declaration of state law that may subsequently prove to
be wrong because of a contrary determination by the state court.
The policy of the Erie case seems clear. It was a recognition of
the independence of the states in their own sphere of the federal-
state relationship. This policy hit a barrier in those situations men-
tioned, due to the inferior capacity-power, not ability-of the fed-
eral courts .2 6 No legislation covered this area. It remained for the
courts to find their own judicial solution.
D. The Doctrine of the Pullman Case
A partial answer has come in the form of the abstention doc-
trine as enunciated by the Court in the Pullman27 case. Pullman
was not the first case in which the device of abstention was em-
ployed, 28 but it was in this case that it was crystallized and identi-
fied as a doctrine.
Over light passenger runs in Texas, the railroads customarily
carried but one Pullman car. The one car was in charge of a porter,
who was a Negro. The Railroad Commission ordered that no sleep-
ing car was to be operated in Texas unless such car was continu-
ously in charge of a Pullman conductor. The Pullman Company
attacked the order as beyond the power of the Railroad Commission
under the Texas statutes. The Pullman porters intervened as com-
plainants alleging unconstitutionality because of discrimination
against Negroes. The three judge district court found that the Texas
statutes did not uphold the Railroad Commission's exercise of power
and enjoined enforcement of the order. On appeal, the Supreme
Court remanded the cause with directions to retain the bill pending
a prompt determination of the applicability of the Texas statute by
the Texas courts.
The Court found the authority for its action in the traditional
discretion of a court of equity. "An appeal to the chancellor . . . is
an appeal to the 'exercise of the sound discretion, which guides the
determination of courts of equity.' . . . The history of equity juris-
diction is the history of regard for public consequences in employing
the extraordinary remedy of the injunction. 2 9
The Court found that the constitutional question presented a
sensitive area of state policy that should not be entered into unless
no alternative to its adjudication was open. Thus, a consideration of
the state law issue was necessitated. O*n this subject the Court com-
mented that a ruling by the federal court would be merely a fore-
cast of the law, because the final authority, the Supreme Court of
Texas, had not spoken on the scope of the statute. "The reign of law
is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is
thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The re-
sources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the
waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature
constitutional adjudication." 0
26 Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases,
67 Yale L. J. 187 (1957).
27 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., supra note 25.
28 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940). Thomoson v.
Magnolia Pet. Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935); Spielman
Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932): Langres
v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929'.




This avoidance of friction was termed by the Court as one of
the public interests having the highest claim on the discretion of
the chancellor. The "contribution of the courts"" based on "impor-
tant considerations of policy,"" - thus emerged as the abstention
doctrine. It is the Court's attempt to further harmonious relations
between state and federal authority.
III. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Interwoven Federal Constitutional and State Law Issues
The application of the abstention doctrine is most clear in those
cases where state action is being challenged as contrary to the fed-
eral constitution and state law questions are present in the case."
An early example of this type of case is Gilchrist v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Co.,"4 where the state question was basic to the con-
troversy. The leading case in this area is the Pullman case, dis-
cussed previously.
In Pullman the court found that the constitutional issue touched
"a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts
ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is
open. ' 'a  In subsequent cases the sensitivity of the state issue has
not been given as great weight as the principle of avoiding an un-
necessary constitutional decision. "" What is most basic in these cases,
although principles of comity are inherent in them, is that by ab-
staining the federal courts avoid the unnecessary adjudication of a
constitutional issue. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has classified the ap-
plication of the abstention doctrine in this area as a phase of the
basic constitutional doctrine that federal courts will determine a
constitutional issue only when no alternative is available.1 7 By sub-
mitting at least the state issues to the state court, the federal courts
give effect to this salutary principle. It is possible that state courts
could give underlying state issues a construction that would avoid
the constitutional issue altogether, or in part,"s or the state court
decision might make determination of the constitutional issue pa-
tently necessary. In any event, the constitutional doctrine will be
served. The Court has indicated that the state courts may be more
likely to give a statute a limiting interpretation than a federal court
wvould.:1:
Another policy recently stated by the Court to be served by
abstention is that by allowing the state courts to first consider the
state issues, the federal court judgment on the constitutional issues
:11 See note 25 supro at 501.
:2 . Ibid.
:: It may be noted here that the Court has not extended abstention to cover cases involving
interwoven state low and non-constitutional federal questions. No case has been found where
abstention has been applied in such a situation. In at least one case, Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S.
472 :1949), the Court has refused to allow abstention where a question of non-constitutional federal
law was intertwined with a state law question. The rationale behind such a result is not entirely
clear. There is evidently no rule requiring a federal court to avoid a decision based on non-consti-
tutional federal grounds where other grounds are available, but it is conceivable that considerations
of comity between state and federal authority could be very strong. Perhaps abstention will be
applied in this class of case in the future. The principle of comity seems as applicable here as
in other situations.
::4 See note 28 supra.
:. See note 25 supra at 498.
-A' Eg., City of Meridian v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Shipman v. OuPre,
339 U.S. 321 (1950); Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (19").
:7 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
7" Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, supra note 36.
:;t- Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
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will be based on "a complete product of the State. '40 Evidently, it
is believed that having a state court interpretation will shed greater
light on the constitutional problem.
The state law issues must be unsettled ones in this area. If there
is no reasonable doubt about the construction, interpretation or ap-
plication of the state law in question,4 the federal court will not
abstain from deciding the issues.42 There may be no reasonable
doubt either because the state issue has already been settled by the
state court or because there is no ambiguity that calls for an inter-
pretation.43 Abstention is not, however, proper simply because there
are unsettled issues of state law.44 If a state court ruling could not
possibly aid in the constitutional adjudication, the federal court
cannot require a prior state court determination.45 The Supreme
Court recently made this point very clear in a case where the dis-
trict court had made a finding only that the state law was unclear.
46
The Court stated that reference to the state courts should not "auto-
matically" be made.
47
In cases involving a constitutional determination the method of
disposition has generally been to retain the case on the federal court
docket and refer the parties to the state courts for an adjudication
of the state issues. The earliest abstention cases were disposed of by
dismissing the action, thereby causing the entire controversy to be
tried in the state courts.4s For a period of time the Court struck
upon a compromise between retention and dismissal. The federal
court would decide the state issue but would provide for a further
decree on order in case of a change in circumstances or a decision of
the state court contrary to that of the federal court on the state
issue.49 It was in the Pullman case that the Court first employed the
device of retention50 and it has continued to do so in constitutional
cases with great regularity. In one case since Pullman the Court
has directed a dismissal in a constitutional case but no distinguish-
40 Id. at 178; accord, Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 363 U.S. 555 (1960).
41 Harrison v. NAACP, supra note 39 at 177.
42 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948;.
43 Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
44 Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956).
45 Public Util. Comm. of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
46 See NAACP v. Bennett, 178 F. Supp. 188 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
47 NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
48 Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453 (1919); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., supra
note 28.
49 Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177 (1933'; Wald
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 602 (1933).
54) See note 25 supra at 501.
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ing reason for its disposition of the case in this manner is appar-
ent.51 Retaining the case seems to imply that the parties are to
present only the state questions to the state courts and return to the
federal courts for a determination of the federal questions. This is
the logical, if time consuming, method of procedure. But this pro-
cedure has been placed in doubt by the Court's decision in Govern-
ment & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor.52 There
the parties had, at the direction of the federal district court, ob-
tained a state supreme court determination that the questioned state
act did apply to the plaintiffs, but the parties did not present the
constitutional objections to the state court. The litigants returned
to the federal courts where they adjudicated the constitutional is-
sue. On appeal the Supreme Court, sua sponte, held that abstention
should have again been employed as the parties had not given the
state court the opportunity to consider the act in the light of the
constitutional objections, which might have made a difference in
the state court's decision. If the parties had done this, they probably
could not have had the constitutional questions decided by the
lower federal courts.53 They would have recourse to the Supreme
Court, but that is no more than they would have had if they had
applied to the state courts originally. It is not clear just how much
of the controversy should be presented to the state court, but in
light of the Windsor case, it would appear to be risky not to present
the constitutional questions.
B. Diversity Actions
Cases in which the jurisdiction of the federal courts is based on
diversity of citizenship have presented difficulties to the Court. The
leading case in this area is Meredith v. Winter Haven..5 4 This was a
diversity case which put into question state constitution and statute
provisions which were unsettled. The district court's dismissal of
the action without prejudice was reversed by the Supreme Court.
"But we are of the opinion that the difficulties of ascertaining what
the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not
in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to de-
cline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly
brought to it for decision."5 5 For abstention to be proper there must
be excep'ional circumstances present in any case, but this is espe-
cially true in a diversity case. The purpose of diversity jurisdiction
is to allow the litigants a federal forum if they so desire, and "denial
of that opportunity by the federal courts merely because the an-
swers to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have
not yet been given by the highest court of the state, would thwart
the purpose of the jurisdictional act. '5 6 Erie did not release federal
courts from the duty of deciding uncertain state law in diversity
cases, but rather placed on them a greater responsibility for deter-
mining and applying state law in all such cases.5 7
51 Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949).
52 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
53 England v. Board of Med. Examiners, 194 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1961).
54 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
55 Id. at 234.
56 Id. at 234-235.
57 Id. at 237.
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Meredith was followed by the federal courts very closely.s
There was no indication that its holding was questioned until 1959
when the Court handed down its decision in Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux.51 t This was a diversity case where
the power of a city to expropriate the property of a private com-
pany was put into question. A state statute seemed to give the city
authority for its actions but a decision of the state's attorney general
held otherwise. The district court stayed proceedings to allow for a
state court adjudication on the interpretation of the statute. The
Court of Appeals reversed. No constitutional questions were pre-
sented to the Supreme Court, but it upheld the district court's deci-
sion. The case set off speculation that it might be interpreted as
warranting abstention in a diversity case simply because the state
law was unsettled or unclear.6 0 But the limiting factors of the case
seem to preclude such a wide interpretation of the case. Eminent
domain, the opinion pointed out, is "intimately involved with sover-
eign prerogative."'" This "special nature" of eminent domain was
apparently relied upon to justify the decision reached.62 Thus it
would seem that the case could be classified as one in which an
exceptional circumstance was present-thereby making the case a
proper one for the application of the doctrine of abstention.
But at the same time the Thibodaux case was decided the Su-
preme Court also passed on County of Allegheney v. Frank Mashu-
da Co. 6" This was also an eminent domain case based on diversity
jurisdiction. Here the Court reversed the district court's judgment
of dismissal. The mere fact that it was an eminent domain case was
not sufficient to require the application of abstention. The only
distinguishing characteristic of the cases is that in Allegheney
County the state law was clear whereas in Thibodaux the state law
was unsettled. Perhaps the holdings in these cases can be reconciled
by construing them together to mean that abstention will be appro-
priate in an eminent domain case where the state law is unsettled.
Subsequent developments do not warrant reading into the cases a
holding that abstention will be applied in a diversity case simply
because the state issues are uncertain. Numerous cases have been
reported since Allegheney County and Thibodaux in which the fed-
eral courts have held it to be their duty to decide unsettled state
law issues in diversity cases. Moreover, two recent diversity cases
in which the Court has ordered abstention involved considerations
of federal constitutional questions,6 thereby demonstrating that
abstention will be proper in a diversity case only if it serves some
countervailing interest.
C. Actions Involving Interference With State Affairs
The principal consideration of the Supreme Court in applying
the doctrine of abstention to a variety of cases is a reluctance to
interfere with the administration by a state of its own affairs. Re-
58 E.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Cos. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954); Estate of Spiegel v. Commis-
sioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
59 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
60 Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 226 (1959); Note, Judicial
Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (1959).
61 See note 59 supra at 28,
62 Ibid.
6: 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
64 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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fusal to exercise its jurisdiction in this type of case is a recognition
by the federal courts that avoidance of federal-state conflict is a
countervailing interest justifying abstention.
1. Bankruptcy Proceedings
One of the first situations in which abstention was held to be
properly employed on grounds of comity was that of bankruptcy
and receivership proceedings. In Pennsylvania v. Williams,! the
Supreme Court found that the district court did have jurisdiction
to appoint a receiver for the liquidation of a state savings and loan
business. The state had provided adequate liquidation procedure
under a state official who had requested the district court to allow
him to administer the liquidation. The Supreme Court ruled that
the district court should have turned the assets of the corporation
over to the state official. "The question is not the ordinary one of
comity between a federal and a state court"'6 where each asserts
jurisdiction over the property and no special reasons are advanced
for relinquishing jurisdiction. "It is in the public interest that fed-
eral courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with
proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments
in carrying out their domestic policy.
7
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 6 1 involved a question of
title to real property in a bankruptcy proceeding. The district court
determined the fee title to be in the bankrupt and the court of ap-
peals reversed. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court
should not have decided the issue since the parties could have re-
ceived an authoritative determination in the state court.
A court of bankruptcy has an exclusive and non-delegable
control over the administration of an estate in its posses-
sion. But the proper exercise of that control may, where the
interests of the estate and the parties will best be served,
lead the bankruptcy court to consent to submission to state
courts of particular controversies involving unsettled ques-
tions of state property law and arising in the course of
bankruptcy administration.' 9
In neither Pennsylvania nor in Thompson were there constitutional
questions present. The cases were apparently based on the rationale
that it is more conducive to a harmonious federal-state relationship
to allow the states to handle state problems.
2. Specialized, Complicated Regulatory Systems
Another area in which the Court has given special emphasis to
principles of comity is that involving state administrative and reg-
ulatory bodies. Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 7 " involved a challenge to an
order of the Texas Railroad Commission concerning the spacing of
oil wells. The Commission's power to provide for the spacing of
wells was part of the state's conservation program. Although a con-
stitutional question was present in the case, the Court did not give
much weight to that factor. Nor did it make much of an issue of the
65 294 U.S. 176 (1935).
66 Id. at 183.
67 Id. at 185.
68 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
69 Id. at 483.
74) 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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uncertainties in the state law. The Court did give great weight to
the fact that the order attacked was part of a complicated regula-
tory scheme concerning state policies, and that the state legislature
had provided that all orders of the Commission could be challenged
in a particular district court of the state, thereby giving that court
special opportunity to develop an expertness in the field. The court
also noted that intervention by the federal court would increase
the hazard of creating uncertainties in the state law.
The second principal case in this area is Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern Ry.71 The railroad desired to abandon several
passenger trains between cities in the state, but before it could do
so it was required to obtain a permit from the Commission. The
Commission refused to allow such a permit. Instead of appealing
to the state courts, the railroad brought a suit in the federal district
court alleging the Commission's order amounted to confiscation of
its property in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The district
court held the Commission's order to be invalid and enjoined it from
enforcing the order. The Supreme Court determined that the federal
courts should refrain from interfering and ordered the district court
to dismiss the action. Again there was a federal constitutional ques-
tion present but the Court did not base its decision on it. It based
its decision on the wisdom of avoiding interference in a matter
"primarily the concern of the state. '7 2 There was an adequate state
court review of the administrative orders so the intervention of the
federal court was not necessary to provide protection for the federal
rights asserted. No mention is made of a presence or absence of
unsettled state questions. The Court apparently deemed the pre-
sence of unsettled state issues as not a necessary requirement to
justify abstention. Unlike the Burford case, the subject matter of
regulation in the Alabama case does not appear to require any spe-
cial expertise. Consequently, a finding that the administrative
body's order deals with a highly complicated area of regulation does
not appear to be a sine qua non to justify abstention.
When the federal courts are dealing with an order of a state
regulatory body in an area primarily of local concern, it seems to
be settled that principles of comity will be decisive of the case with-
out regard to federal constitutional questions. Whether or not there
are unsettled state issues involved is immaterial.
3. State's Enforcement of Criminal Law
It is a general rule of equity that a federal court will not pre-
vent the enforcement of a state's criminal statutes even though
they may be unconstitutional. 73 This is especially true if the only
action threatened is a prosecution in the state courts of an alleged
violation of state law, for the disputed questions can be presented
to the state court.74 Interpretation of the state legislation is pri-
marily the function of the authorities. 75 Consequently, interference
with the processes of a state's criminal law "can be justified only
in most exceptional circumstances, and upon clear showing that an
71 341 u.s. 341 (1951).
72 Id. at 345.
73 Spielman Motor Soles Co., Inc. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
74 Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
75 Albertson v. Millard. 345 U.S. 242 (1953).
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injunction is necessary in order to prevent irreparable injury. r7
There is always the opportunity to appeal an adverse constitutional
decision by the state courts to the Supreme Court so that the federal
rights of the parties will be protected.
4. Collection of State Taxes
In the area of state taxation the federal courts have a guide
from Congress in its legislation prohibiting injunctions against the
assessment, levy or collection of a state tax under specific circum-
stances. 77 The Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman 7s case
did not fall within the prohibition of the statute, but the Court de-
termined that the policy of not interfering with a state's fiscal po-
licy was of such importance that it would not entertain a declara-
tory judgment action to adjudicate the tax statute's constitution-
ality where adequate relief could be obtained in the state courts.
7
11
The question of the validity of a state tax is one which the state
courts are peculiarly fitted to answer and the federal courts should
not attempt an adjudication unless absolutely necessary. 0
In cases where abstention finds its jusification primarily in
principles of comity, the procedure followed by the courts is to dis-
miss the action rather than retain it. This is in accord with the
raitonale requiring abstention in these cases, for if the courts refrain
from acting so as not to interfere with the administration by a state
of its own affairs, there is no motive to retain the case. The reason
the federal court would abstain in the first place is because it
should not involve itself with the states' affairs. Whether or not
the state law is settled in these cases is immaterial. The problem
of interpreting uncertain state law does not present itself once the
court determines it should have nothing to do with the case.
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE
The present status of the doctrine in the great majority of cases,
those dealing with constitutional questions, seems to be fairly well
settled. The criteria for determining whether to abstain are that
obtaining a state court adjudication on the state questions will avoid
an unnecessary constitutional determination and that the state
questions actually be unsettled. Of course, principles of comity are
implicit in these cases, but the Court places its reliance mainly on
avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions. Whether a new
criterion has been established in Harrison v. NAACP,"1 which would
require a decision by a federal court on the constitutionality of a
state enactment to be based on "a complete product of the State,
' 2
remains to be seen. The decision of the Court in a later case, Met-
lakatla Indian Community v. Egan,s 3 seems to rely on this principle,
but the case can also be explained on the grounds of avoidance of
an unnecessary constitutional decision.
76 Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., supra note 74 at 50.
77 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958).
78 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
79 See Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932).
80 United States v. City of New York, 175 F.2d 75 (2nd Cir. 1949); but cf., United States v.
Bureau of Revenue of State of New Mexico, 291 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1961).
SI 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
82 Id. at 178.
83 363 U.S. 555 (1960).
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In the cases having avoidance of unseemly conflict between
state and federal authorities as their basis, the criteria are not quite
so clear. This is because the Court has taken an ad hoc approach to
the subject, allowing abstention only in the situations of bank-
ruptcy, taxes, criminal law, and administrative decisions. Within
this area, it is apparently immaterial whether the state law is un-
settled or not, since the court's main purpose in abstaining is to
avoid conflict. The Supreme Court has not laid down clear guide-
lines for the lower courts to follow in this area. For example, what
is matter of primarily local concern, and when is it proper to abstain
in tax cases? Although the Court has determined that abstention in
a tax case can be proper, it has not set out sufficient guides as to
when it is so.
Originally, the Court found its authority to abstain from the
exercise of its jurisdiction in the discretion of a court of equity.1
4
All of the cases in which abstention had been employed were cases
addressed to the federal court as a court of equity. Then in the
Thibodaux case the Court authorized abstention in a case at law.8
"These prior cases have been cases in equity, but they did not apply
a technical rule of equity procedure. They reflect a deeper policy
derived from our federalism.18 7 This language of the Court was
somewhat diluted, however, by the emphasis placed on the special
nature of eminent domain proceedings. In two subsequent cases the
court has strengthened the force of its holding by applying absten-
tion when the actions were at law and did not involve any special
type of proceedings."8 These last two cases seem to resolve any
doubt left by Thibodaux in establishing that abstention may be
employed in a case at law as well as in equity., 9
There has been some doubt that the doctrine of abstention
would be applicable in cases involving civil rights.90 Harrison v.
S4 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
85 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
86 An "eminent domain proceeding is deemed for certain purposes of legal classification a 'suit
at common law.' " Id. at 28.
87 Ibid.
88 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
89 See Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v.
City of North Kansas City, 276 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1960); Beach v. Rome Trust Co., 269 F.2d 367
(2nd Cir. 1959).
1t0 See Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Doctrne of Equitable Abstention Applied to Civil Rights Cases,
20 La. L. Rev. 614 (1960).
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NAACP!"' has laid this doubt to rest, for that case involved the in-
terpretation of a state's statutes said to infringe upon the plaintiff's
civil rights. The Court ordered the lower court to abstain, indicat-
ing that the same criteria used in any other constitutional question
case should be considered in a civil rights case involving the con-
stitutional validity of a state statute.
An interesting recent use of abstention principles is found in
cases dealing with apportionment of representatives to state legis-
latures. In several of these cases the lower federal cour t s have
stayed the actions to allow the state legislatures a reasonable oppor-




The doctrine of abstention has a useful position in the judicial
process. It has the capability, wisely used, of greatly reducing con-
flict between state and federal authorities. By providing a cushion
in areas where state and federal authority clash, the federal courts
have made a significant contribution to greater harmony between
the two realms of sovereignty. In addition, abstention has presented
a method whereby advantage can be taken of the respective exper-
tise of the feedral and state courts in the dual court system that we
have. 9" State courts are considered to be experts in state law, and
the federal courts are considered to be the authorities on federal
questions. The principal difficulty with the abstention doctrine is
the problem of delay. The Court has indicated that considerations
of delay, cost and inconvenience to the parties are not to be weighed
heavily when the courts are "concerned with the much larger issue
as to the appropriate relationship between federal and state authori-
ties functioning as a harmonious whole. '" 4 That delay can become
a serious problem is witnessed by the Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v.
McLaughlin"5 and Government and Civic Employees Organizing
Comm. v. Windsor"6 cases. The Spector case was kept in litigation
for a decade, 9 7 and in the Windsor case, after five years in the-
courts, no decision was reached." The Windsor case itself indicated
some measure of solution to the problem by requiring all issues in
the case to be presented to the state court. This, however, runs up
against the argument that such a procedure effectively denies fed-
eral jurisdiction altogether.
A solution to this problem has been presented by the state of
Florida. The Florida legislature has given the Supreme Court of
Florida authority to accept and give instructions on questions of
state law certified to it by any appellate court in the federal sys-
tem."' The federal courts have apparently taken advantage of this
provision only once, 100 but it seems that this is an excellent answer
to the problem of delay.
')1 360 U.S. 267 (1959).
92 Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Go. 1962); Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245 (M.D.
Ala. 1962); Wesberry v. Vondiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
93 See Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960).
94 Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 172 (1942).
95323 U.S. 101 (1944).
96353 U.S. 364 (1957).
97 See note 93 supra.
98 Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 Texas L. Rev. 815 (1959).
99 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 25.031 (19591.
1O Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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CASE COMMENTS
WORLD COURT-CAMBODIA V. THAILAND-
BOUNDARY DISPUTE
By CHRISTOPHER R. BRAUCHLI *
On June 15, 1962, the International Court of Justice rendered
a decision' resolving a boundary dispute between Cambodia and
Thailand concerning the question of which of the two countries had
territorial sovereignty over the Temple of Preah Vihear. This
Temple is situate on a promontory belonging to the Eastern sector
of the Dangrek range of mountains which in a general way con-
stitutes the boundary separating Cambodia and Thailand. The dis-
pute arose out of a boundary settlement entered into by France2
and Siam3 between 1904 and 1908. The settlement evolved in the
following manner: February 13, 1904, a treaty was entered into by
Siam and France which, inter alia, defined that part of the bound-
ary between Siam and French Indo-China encompassing the Tem-
ple. Article 1 of the treaty stated that the boundary would be
marked by the water shed line. Article 3 of the treaty provided, in
addition, that delimitation of the frontier between the two countries
would be carried out by mixed commissions composed of officers
appointed by Siam and French Indo-China, and should relate among
other things to the frontier "determined" by Article 1. After the
mixed commission had completed its survey of the border as pro-
vided in Article 3, the French, at the request of the Siamese who
lacked adequate technical facilities, agreed to prepare maps of the
frontier as the final stage of the delimitation. The maps were com-
pleted in 1907 and copies furnished to the Siamese government. The
maps thus prepared placed the Temple of Preah Vihear on the
French Indo-China side of the border and the dispute between
Cambodia and Thailand arose from the fact that the Thais asserted
that had the water shed line designated in Article 1 been followed,
the Temple would clearly have been in Thai territory. After lengthy
argument by both sides, the court concluded that the boundaries
shown in the map were controlling and awarded the Temple to
Cambodia. The court ruled that it was unnecessary to decide wheth-
er placement of the boundary in such a way as to effect a departure
from the water shed line was so insignificant as to fall within the
discretionary powers of the mixed commission and further held that
it was unnecessary to decide whether Article 1 or Article 3 of the
treaty should control. It held instead that the governments involved
* Associated with the Denver firm of Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and Grover; Member
C.B.A. Committee on World Peace Through Law, and the Committee on International Courts of the
A.B.A. Section on International and Comparative Law. Mr. Justice Leonard v. B. Sutton is chairman
of the C.B.A. Committee on World Peace Through Law. A function of this Committee is to bring
to the attention of the Bar and laity of Colorado present instances of effective world and inter-
national law in order to foster understanding of the rule of law among nations.
1 Case concerning Temple of Preah Viheor (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of
June 15, 1962: International Court of Justice Reports 1962, p. 6.
2 Before Cambodia obtained its independence in 1953, it was a part of French Indo-China.
3 Siam become known as Prathet-Thai or Thailand subsequent to May 11, 1949.
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had the authority to adopt departures from Article 1 of the treaty
if they saw fit so to do and concluded that Siam and subsequently
Thailand had in fact adopted the boundaries set forth in the treaty.
4
In support of its holding, the court traced events since the maps
were initially given to the Siamese government and concluded from
an examination of these matters that Siam had had ample oppor-
tunitv since the initial publication of the maps to dispute their
validity insofar as placement of the Temple was concerned but had
never done so.5  The court held that when the parties by treaty
provided both the water shed would govern and that there would be
a delimitation of the boundary line by a mixed commission, they
must have regarded the water shed line as sufficiently certain to
be relied upon without any further delimitation. The court pointed
out that for fifty years Thailand had enjoyed stable frontiers
through accepting the benefits the treaty of 1904 conferred upon it
and stated that Thailand could not now, having claimed and enjoyed
the benefits of the settlement, deny that it had consented to it. The
court further concluded that the acceptance of the map by the
parties caused the map to enter the treaty settlement and was
evidence of the interpretation the two governments gave to the
delimitation required by Article 3 of the treaty.
It should be noted that Thailand did not willingly submit itself
to the jurisdiction of the World Court. In 1961, it submitted pre-
liminary objections to that body stating that it had never accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice."
The court ruled against Thailand, stating that through its actions
prior to the dispute it had indicated a willingness to be subject to
the jurisdiction of the court. Although Thailand accepted this ruling
and proceeded with its presentation of the case on the merits, it
took certain steps after the final decision was announced which are
as noteworthy as the decision itself, and reflect its dissatisfaction
with having been compelled to submit to the court's jurisdiction.
It boycotted meetings of the Southeast Treaty Organization
(SEATO) for approximately one month after the decision was
rendered; 7 it cut off trade with Poland, as reason therefore stating
that the court which had decided against it was headed by a Polish
judge: and finally, it recalled its ambassador to France, the ap-
parent reason for this move being that two French lawyers were
on the Cambodian legal team.s It is to be hoped that this reaction
4 The award in favor of Cambodia was nine to three, two judges not participating. It is
interesting to note that in the majority opinion no authority is cited for the decision rendered by
the court in contrast to the concurring and dissenting opinions which cite considerable authority
both in support of and in contravention of the court's decision.
5 Among other things, the court pointed out that in 1946 a Franco-Siomese conciliation com-
mission was set up to make recommendations in regard to any complaints or proposals for revisions
Thailand might wish to make as to, among other things, the frontier settlements of 1904 and
1907. The commission met in 1947 and although Siam made complaints about the frontier line
in a number of regions, no mention was made of the region wherein the Temple is situate. The
court further observed that in 1949 and on numerous occasions thereafter, notes were filed by the
government of France and later by the government of Cambodia to the Siamese and Thai govern-
ments requesting that the keepers or "police" placed by Siam and Thailand in the Temple be
withdrawn. None of these notes was answered and the court concluded that although Thailand
was willing to place such keepers in the Temple it was unwilling to deny at the diplomatic level
the claim of the French and later the Cambodians that the Temple belonged to Cambodia.
6 Article 36.2 of the Statute establishing the World Court provides as follows: "The state
parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of. the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. The interpretation of a treaty .... .
7 N.Y. Times, July 19, 1962, p. 2, col. 3.
S N.Y. Times, June 23, 1962, p. 2, col. 1. The author wrote both the Polish and French embassies
in Washington. D. C. to inquire whether normal relations have been resumed but no replies had
been received from either of these embassies as of the date this article was prepared.
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to the decision of the World Court will not set a precedent to be
followed by other nations against whom decisions are rendered. It
is almost too obvious to warrant mention that if it became a prac-
tice for countries to threaten or take retalliatory action against
countries who have judges on the court or counsel arguing before
the court, it's efficacy would be sharply curtailed. The judicial ob-
jectivity of the court could rapidly give way to politically inspired
decisions designed to curry favor with one of the parties to a dis-
pute. Under the present set-up there is little which can be done to
prevent this type of action and it can only be hoped that other
countries accepting the jurisdiction of the court will avoid using
political pressures to influence the court or to retalliate for unfavor-
able decisions.9
DAMAGES - PERSONAL INJURIES - PER DIEM
ARGUMENT TO BE ALLOWED
In an action for damages for bodily injuries, the trial court re-
fused to allow plaintiff's counsel to suggest a per diem argument
to the jury on the elements of past and future pain and suffering.
On appeal, seeking a reversal and remand for a new trial on the
issue of damages only, Held: Inasmuch as both the total amount
claimed and the plaintiff's life expectancy may be argued in Colo-
rado, so also may counsel illustrate the mathematical process of
computing the gross amount sought for pain and suffering by re-
ducing it to the units by which it is endured, i.e., segments of time.
Newbury v. Vogel, 15 Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv. Sh. 11 (1963).
The propriety of using a per diem or time segment theory in
counsel's closing argument was of first impression in the principal
case, although it has been the subject of decision and discussion in
9 Keeping in mind Thailand's reaction to this decision the recent suggestion that World Court
judges should be mode world citizens rather than citizens of individual countries assumes new
meaning and it is possible that in the future this will be the most desirable step to take to
avoid the perils to the efficacy of the court seen by the author as a result of actions such as
those token by Thailand. The world citizenship proposal has been advanced in a preliminary
draft plan for changes in the International Court of Justice submitted by Eberhard P. Deutsch to
the American Bar Association Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations.
SFine residential 1uildels.
H E AL KEN BERG
____________CONSTRUCTION
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numerous other jurisdictions.' The authorities appear to be divided
among (1) those who hold the argument is proper;- (2) those who
declare it to be a matter within the discretion of the trial court;
:'
and (3) those who refuse to allow it.
4
Pennsylvania has stood opposed to any argument equating dol-
lars with pain and suffering since 1891.; Most of the jurisdictions,
however, which have refused to allow use of the per diem argument
rely on recent decisions in which the courts have held that such
arguments have no foundation in evidence and invade the province
of the jury.6
Those in opposition have also stressed that defendant's counsel,
in attempting to mitigate such evaluations, necessarily lends sup-
port to plaintiff's implication that pain and suffering may be given
a precise value 7 and that intensity of pain must vary.s It is urged
that such arguments would lead to "monstrous" verdicts,9 would
mislead the jury, 0 and might, if reduced to a logical conclusion,
result in evaluating pain and suffering at a "penny per heartbeat,"
or the like. 1 There are at least nine jurisdictions which categorical-
ly refuse to allow per diem argument. on these and other grounds.1'
2
Those jurisdictions which have either held the argument to be
proper, or to be within the discretion of the trial court, rely heavily
on Ratner v. Arrington,' a 1959 Florida case, in which the court
rhetorically asked why, if it is proper to argue for a given total,
is it not likewise proper to illustrate how the plaintiff arrived at
that figure.
Of those jurisdictions which have considered the point, at least
eleven have left it within the discretion of the trial court,' 4 and at
least the same number have simply allowed it, albeit with some
I Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958, Supp. 1960, 1962, 1963).
2 Newbury v. Vogel, 15 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 11 (1963); Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App.2d
323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961), later overruled in Coley v. Manicke, 24 111.2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206
(1962); Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Bone, 180 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. 1962); Corkery v.
Greenberg, 114 N.W.2d 327 (Iowa 1962); Eastern Shore Public Service Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md.
411, 177 A.2d 701 (1962), off'd, 180 A.2d 681 (Md. 1962); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109
N.W.2d 828 (1961); Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957); Hernandez v. Baucum,
344 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1961); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575
(1960); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash.2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960); Evening Star Newspaper Co. v.
Gray, 179 A.2d 377 (D.D.C. 1962).
2McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d
82 (Fla. 1959); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); Little v. Hughes,
136 So. 2d 448 (La. 1961); Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d 633
(1958); 4-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); Johnson v.
Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509
(N.D. 1961); Hall v. Booth, 178 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio 1961); J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler,
231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex, 1950); Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1961).
4 Henne v. Bolick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Caley v. Manicke, 24 lll.2d 390, 182
N.E.2d 206 (1962); Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d
873 (1955); Goldstein v Fendelman, 336 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1960); Chamberlain v. Palmer Lumber,
104 N.H. 221, 183 A.2d 906 (1962); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Stassun v.
Chopin, 324 Pa. 127, 188 AtI. 111 (1936); Certified T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Horrington, 201 Va.
109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959); Armstead v. Holbert, 122 S.E.2d 43 (W. Va. 1961); Affett v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis.2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
5 Stassun v. Chopin, 324 Pa. 127, 188 AtI. 111 (1936).
6 Chamberlain v. Palmer Lumber, Inc., 104 N.H. 221, 183 A.2d 9C6 (1962); Botta v. Brunner,
26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Certified T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109
S.E.2d 126 (1959).
7 Botta e. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955); Cer-
tified T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959); Affett v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis.2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
! Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955).
10 Ibid.; See also Chamberlain v. Palmer Lumber, 104 N.H. 221, 183 A.2d 906 (1962).
11 Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.. 11 Wis.2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
12 See note 4 supra.
1.3 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959).
14 See note 3 supro.
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qualifications. ' Both of these groups have pointed out that juries
might spontaneously strike upon the method, and that counsel
should therefore not be prohibited from suggesting it.16 They also
note that the very lack of any standard of value argues for latitude
in discussions of pain and suffering as elements of damages, 7 and
that argument in mitigation may be made without implying an
admission of liability, for as defendants must now attempt to miti-
gate the plaintiff's lump-sum claim, the need to mitigate component
claims will impose no undue hardships.' It has even been noted
that juries are likely to regard such arguments as "lawyer talk,"
and that as courts customarily instruct that such arguments are
not to be considered as evidence, excessive verdicts will not neces-
sarily follow.19
It may be seen that of the thirty-one jurisdictions here considered,
two-thirds of these will, under some circumstances at least, allow
the per diem argument, usually requiring the trial court to caution
the jury as to the weight to be given the argument .20 These courts
have allowed counsel to break the time segments down to units of
weeks, 21 days,'2 2 or even hours.2 3 Nor has the per diem illustration
been restricted to closing argument, e.g., Mississippi allows it to be
used in counsel's opening statement.
24
Colorado counsel have for many years used the per diem meth-
od of argument as to the elements of past and future pain and suf-
fering, and it is significant that the principal case represents the
first time that it has been deemed a subject fit for appellate review.
Here, as in the law of contracts, silence would seem to have been
acceptance of its propriety, at least as being within the discretion
of the trial court. Colorado has now moved in the direction of sev-
eral of her sister states25 in removing it from the realm of the trial
court's discretion and giving it categorical approval. This is an
enlightened view, appreciating the argument for what it is, merely
a course of reasoning as is any other argument on the elements
of pain and suffering.
It will be of interest to note the effect of the principal case. as
Colorado is not presently considered a "high verdict state,"'26 and in
some quarters is even regarded as being somewhat penurious. The
Colorado plaintiff is now guaranteed the opportunity to argue and
illustrate his process of evaluating pain and suffering, unfettered
by judicial apron-strings.
PAUL S. GOLDMAN
15 See note 2 supra.
16 Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1959).
17 Caley v. Manicke, 29 III. App.2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961); Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24,
169 A.2d 661 (1961).
IS Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App.2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961).
19 Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Bone, 180 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. 1962); Yates v. Wenk,
363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961).
20 McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958); Little v. Hughes, 136 So. 2d 448
(La. 1961); Eastern Shore Public Service Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 177 A.2d 701 (1962); Boutang
v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1957); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins.
Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash.2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960);
Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Gray, 179 A.2d (D.D.C. 1962).
21 Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661 (1961).
22 See note 13 supra.
23 Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Bone, 180 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. 1962); Little v. Hughes,
136 So. 2d 448 (La. 1961); Hall v. Booth, 178 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio 1961).
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OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION ADOPTED MARCH 16, 1963
SYLLABUS
It is improper for a lawyer to conduct the trial of a lawsuit on
behalf of a client when the lawyer knows in advance of trial that
it is probable that his partner will be a witness in the lawsuit and
will be required to testify to other than merely formal matters.
FACTS
Law firm F defended its client C in a lawsuit brought by A. B
is obligated to hold C harmless from claims of A, including litiga-
tion costs and attorneys' fees but has refused to do so.
After the termination of the lawsuit by A, C wishes to sue B
under the indemnity agreement. A partner in law firm F is expected
to be a witness for the plaintiff in this action. He would testify con-
cerning certain aspects relating to the first action other than merely
formal matters.
May another partner in law firm F properly conduct the law-
suit on behalf of C against B?
OPINION
Canon 19 reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to
merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody
of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of
the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends
of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in be-
half of his client.
We consider the only question to be whether, on these facts,
another member of the law firm of the attorney-witness may be
considered "other counsel" within the intent of this Canon. We be-
lieve that this question must be answered in the negative.
On two previous occasions this Committee has considered the
propriety of a partner of a lawyer engaging in some activity in
which the lawyer himself could not properly engage. Opinion No.
18, 38 Dicta 263 and Opinion No. 21, first published in 38 Dicta 369,
amended and republished in 39 Dicta 265. Both opinions quote with
approval from Opinions No. 49 and 72 of the American Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Professional Ethics as follows:
The relation of partners in a law firm are such that
neither the firm nor any member or associate thereof may
accept any professional employment which any member of
the firm may not properly accept.
We believe that this statement is also applicable to the facts stated
above.
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Although the question is not raised by the facts presented, the
Committee feels that an exception might properly exist where the
possible need for the lawyer to testify at the trial cannot reasonably
be foreseen in advance of the trial. Under such circumstances, upon
advising the judge and opposing counsel, and with the sanction of
the trial court, it might be appropriate for another member of the
firm of the lawyer-witness to conduct the remainder of the litiga-
tion. This would be true only if the client's interests would be ad-
versely affected because outside counsel could not become suffi-
ciently familiar with the case in the middle of the lawsuit to fully
represent the client. This problem would not arise where the need
to testify can be anticipated in advance of the trial.
The Committee is aware that the ABA Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics has concluded that a partner of the lawyer-witness
may be considered "other counsel" within the meaning of Canon 19,
ABA Opinion No. 220. This Committee feels that the views ex-
pressed by Committee Members Houghton and Brand in dissenting
to ABA Opinion No. 220 are more compelling than the views ex-
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